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JUDICIAL POWER TO REGULATE PLEA BARGAINING
DARRYL K. BROWN*
ABSTRACT
Plea bargaining in the United States is in critical respects unreg-
ulated, and a key reason is the marginal role to which judges have
been relegated. In the wake of Santobello v. New York (1971), lower
courts crafted Due Process doctrines through which they supervised
the fairness of some aspects of the plea bargaining process. Within a
decade, however, U.S. Supreme Court decisions began to shut down
any constitutional basis for judicial supervision of plea negotiations
or agreements. Those decisions rested primarily on two claims: sepa-
ration of powers and the practical costs of regulating plea bargaining
in busy criminal justice systems. Both rationales proved enormously
influential. Legislative rulemaking and state courts both largely
followed the Court in excluding judgesand in effect, the lawfrom
any meaningful role.
This Article challenges these longstanding rationales. Historical
practice suggests that separation of powers doctrine does not require
the prevailing, exceedingly broad conception of exclusive executive
control over charging and other components of the plea process. This
is especially true in the states, many of which had long traditions of
private prosecutors and judicial oversight over certain prosecution
decisions, as well as different constitutional structures. By contrast,
English courtsbased on both common law and legislationretain
some power to review such decisions. Moreover, assertions that legal
constraints on plea bargaining would fatally impair the efficiency
of adjudication is belied by evidence of very high guilty plea rates
* O.M. Vicars Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. This Article bene-
fitted from many thoughtful readers of earlier drafts who participated in this Symposium and
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both in England, where bargaining is more regulated, and in U.S.
courts before the Supreme Court closed off meaningful grounds for
judicial review.
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INTRODUCTION
The pervasiveness of plea bargaining and the rarity of trials are
familiar features of American criminal justice systems. For years
the federal courts have achieved more than 95 percent of all convic-
tions through guilty pleas, and in most state courts, the figures are
in the same ballpark.1 But the triumph of plea bargaining (in
George Fishers description) hardly distinguishes criminal adjudica-
tion in the United States from the practices of legal systems
elsewhere.2 Plea bargaining, or some comparable form of abbrevi-
ated, consent-based adjudication process, is widely and routinely
relied upon in criminal justice systems worldwide as an alternative
to trials. Even though negotiated settlements of criminal prosecu-
tions fit much less comfortably in the civil law tradition than the
common law tradition,3 civil law jurisdictions have adopted their
own variants of plea bargaining as well.4
1. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
2. See generally George Fisher, Plea Bargainings Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859-61
(2000) (arguing that plea bargaining has won because it is now the predominant practice in
the U.S. and other common law nations).
3. See WORLD PLEA BARGAINING: CONSENSUAL PROCEDURES AND THE AVOIDANCE OF THE
FULL CRIMINAL TRIAL, at xxii (Stephen C. Thaman ed., 2010) [hereinafter WORLD PLEA
BARGAINING] (noting that while it is clear that many European nations have been
traditionally hostile to American-style plea bargaining, most have adopted it).
4. See Bron McKillop, What Can We Learn from the French Criminal Justice System?,
76 AUSTL. L.J. 49, 55-56 (2002) (stating that 99.8 percent of French criminal cases are
adjudicated in lower courts with expedited processes); Thomas Weigend, Lay Participation
and Consensual Disposition Mechanisms, 72 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 595,
595-96 (2001) (Fr.) (describing trend toward plea bargaining or similar nontrial adjudication
in many countries). See generally JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAININGACROSSBORDERS (Hiram
E. Chodosh ed., 2009) (describing bargaining practices in Germany, Russia, Bulgaria, China,
and Japan); WORLD PLEA BARGAINING, supra note 3, at xx (noting that many countries that
rely on a strict legality principle have made radical steps towards confession or plea
bargaining); Arie Freiberg, Non-Adversarial Approaches to Criminal Justice, 17 J. JUD.
ADMIN. 205 (2007) (Austl.) (discussing the high plea bargaining rate in Australia).
In 1987, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation R (87) 18 urged
member states to use discretionary prosecution and develop simplified, out-of-court pro-
cedures for minor offences as a means to reduce delay in criminal justice systems. COMM. OF
MINISTERS, COUNCIL OF EUR., RECOMMENDATION NO. R (87) 18 OF THE COMMITTEE OF MIN-
ISTERS TO MEMBER STATES CONCERNING THE SIMPLIFICATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1987),
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Ins
tranetImage=608011&SecMode=1&DocId=694270&Usage=2 [https://perma.cc/Q7DK-6VR4].
Interestingly, across national contexts bargaining usually seems to develop from the bottom
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Despite lamentations for the vanishing trial and criticisms of
plea negotiation practices, the basic appeal of negotiated guilty
pleas is easy to understand. Negotiated settlements are perfectly
adequate and uncontroversial in many cases. Some defendants are
quite willing to plead guilty. Oftentimes facts are relatively simple;
evidence of guilt is comprehensive and unambiguous without trial;
and the criminal charge does not call for normative assessments of
reasonable justification, recklessness, or the like. 
Originally, a core function of the common law trial was to gather
evidence. After the early common law era in which jurors were
expected to know many facts or investigate on their own, the trial
became a means to produce evidence, such as witness testimony
that sometimes even the parties had not previously heard.5 The
evidence-gathering function of trials is much less necessary today,
for many reasons. New forms of evidence, such as audio and visual
recordings and various kinds of forensic analysis, provide key
evidence well before trial. Police have firsthand knowledge of many
crimes, such as drug or weapon possession, and they often gather
statements from witnesses and suspects. Moreover, many offens-
essuch as possession crimesare defined in ways that are easy to
prove.
Many criminal cases simply do not require a trial to determine
what happened or what liability should follow from it. But it is not
always easy to agree on which cases are clear from pretrial investi-
gation sources and which are not.
In addition, even though national wealthmeasured by per
capita GDPhas never been higher,6 there is a strong consensus
that governments for the last half century or much longer cannot
afford to fund criminal justice systems that adjudicate more than a
small fraction of prosecutions through ordinary trials.7 Legislators,
up; it starts out in trial courts and later gains statutory or appellate courts endorsement.
5. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE
L.J. 522, 531-32 (2012).
6. See GDP Per Capita (Current US$), WORLDBANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.PCAP.CD [https://perma.cc/52C4-3PVJ] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
7. Cf., e.g., NATL CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSN, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL BUDGET CUTS ON
STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTI-
TIONERS (2012), http://www.ncja.org/sites/default/files/documents/NCJA-VERA-Summar-of-
Sequestration-Survery-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6HS-S8G2].
1230 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1225
prosecutors, and nearly everyone else share the U.S. Supreme
Courts conclusion that plea bargaining[ ] is an essential compo-
nent of the administration of justice, without which the States and
the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the
number of judges and court facilities.8 [W]e accept plea bargaining
because many believe that without it ... our system of criminal
justice would grind to a halt.9 The same view is now common in
criminal justice systems outside the United States as well.10 There
are good reasons to be skeptical of this conventional wisdom, many
of which I have offered elsewhere.11 Nonetheless, contemporary
demands on courts to adjudicate criminal charges exceed courts
capacity to do so through ordinary jury trial process.
These systemic developments cut across national boundaries and
probably go a long way toward explaining why U.S. jurisdictions
have much company in the routine practice of plea bargaining.
While plea bargaining is pervasive worldwide, U.S.-style bargain-
ing rules are not. Under state and federal law, plea bargaining is, in
effect, unregulated. To be sure, there is a body of law that governs
plea bargaining. For example, prosecutors cannot use illicit pres-
sures to coerce defendants into pleading guilty, and judges must
ensure that defendants knowingly waive their trial rights and that
any guilty plea has a factual basis.12 The law of plea bargaining,
however, is much like the law of free markets, which is the source
of its underlying logic and rationality. As is true for parties in the
8. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); see also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439
U.S. 212, 219-20 n.9 (1978) (noting that bargaining is the most important means of achieving
the interest of the State in efficient criminal procedure (citing Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427
U.S. 618, 627-38, 627 n.4 (1976))). Compare Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 372 (1978)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (The plea-bargaining process ... is essential to the functioning of the
criminal-justice system.), with Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendants
Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932-37
(1983) (noting and rebutting claims of plea bargainings practical necessity and evaluating
ways to overcome the prevalence of plea bargaining).
9. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., Donna Hackett, Commentary, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST.
501, 501 (2004) (Plea bargaining has become absolutely essential to the Crowns management
of the high volume of criminal cases.) (author is a justice on the Ontario Court of Justice).
11. See DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND LAIS-
SEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 154-55, 167-71 (2016); Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse
Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183, 185-87 (2014) (arguing that in-
creased efficiency in the criminal justice system actually leads to increased demand).
12. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.15(4) (McKinney 2015).
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private market realm, parties in criminal litigation are free to nego-
tiate and employ any tactics that ordinary criminal law does not
prohibit. That means that prosecutors cannot perpetrate frauds or
threaten physical harm, and the terms of agreements must be with-
in existing criminal and sentencing laws. But as in the market
realm, nearly anything else goes. In particular, prosecutors can act
strategically and add charges solely if a defendant insists on trial,13
and they can pressure defendants by leveraging circumstances such
as limited defense resources,14 pretrial detention that disrupts work
and family obligations, or the threat of prosecution against family
members if defendants refuse to plead guilty.15
In short, American plea bargaining is highlyprobably unique-
lyderegulated. It is less regulated than comparable domains of
executive branch enforcement authority, and probably less regu-
lated than the criminal justice systems of other common law juris-
dictions. In this Article, I explore reasons why this is so and, in the
process, suggest how it could change. The first reason, taken up in
Part II, arises from a presumption that prosecutorial decision mak-
ing is an exclusively executive endeavor. This view has evolved
into a flawed body of federal and state constitutional law, often
grounded in separation of powers jurisprudence, that is inconsistent
with the history of criminal justice administration in many states,
and has led courts to reject even the most modest and plausible
oversight of prosecutorial authority. This jurisprudential conception,
which is remarkably consistent across state and federal jurisdic-
tions, has stripped courts of any capacity to regulate even at the
extremes of prosecutorial plea bargaining tactics. As a point of
comparison, Part III describes some of the key provisions of English
criminal law that enable courts to play a modest, but meaningful,
role in monitoring prosecutorial charging discretion. Charging de-
cisions are central to the most controversial and problematic forms
of plea bargaining, and English law demonstrates one plausible
route by which courts can play an appropriate oversight role, con-
sistent with the traditional common law powers of judges and
prosecutors.
13. See infra note 16.
14. See infra note 137.
15. See BROWN, supra note 11, at 95-97.
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Part IV recalls a body of doctrine in federal constitutional law
through which U.S. courts have exercised meaningful oversight of
prosecutorial discretion in the plea bargaining context. The U.S.
Supreme Court eventually shut down this mode of plea bargaining
regulation and elected to build the federal constitutional law of plea
bargaining around a market-inspired understanding of the practice
modeled closely on the private law of contract. State courts over-
whelmingly followed suit and, if only through inaction, legislatures
did as well. This market- and contract-based understanding of plea
bargaining provides not only a template for the public law governing
plea negotiations but also a normative justification for the fairness
and desirability of unregulated bargaining, without legal standards
or judicial scrutiny, even in the most extreme instances of plea
bargaining practice. The Conclusion suggests that this market-
inspired normative vision, as well as the assumption that prosecuto-
rial discretion is immune from legal regulation and oversight, will
have to change before American plea bargaining can be regulated to
the modest, but important, degree that governs much of U.S. civil
law enforcement and much of criminal law enforcement outside the
United States.
I. LEGAL REGULATION AND JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Decisions about which criminal charges defendants will face play
a central role in plea bargaining. Prosecutors typically have an
array of choices for how to charge a particular suspect on a particu-
lar set of facts, and those decisions are affected by the subsequent
plea bargaining process. Prosecutors can charge multiple offenses
or the most serious ones, and offer to drop some charges or reduce
the severity of charges, in exchange for a guilty plea. Alternately,
prosecutors can request that defendants plead guilty to the initial
charges and warn that they will add more serious charges if defen-
dants refuse to plead guilty. Charging tactics of this sort are routine
and well documented in U.S. courts.16
16. For a study documenting this practice that includes a survey of prosecutors and
defense attorneys, see U.S. SENTENCINGCOMMN, REPORT TOTHE CONGRESS:MANDATORY MIN-
IMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 107-09 (2011), http://www.
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Because they are left to prosecutors discretion, charging decisions
are the least regulated aspect of the criminal process. In jurisdic-
tions with limited judicial sentencing discretion due to mandatory
sentencing law or narrowly tailored guidelines, prosecutors charg-
ing choices havetremendous, sometimes determinate, influence over
the punishments that attach after a defendants guilty plea or trial
conviction.17 Unrestrained charging discretion combined with broad
criminal codes and power to define sentencing differentials are the
sources of prosecutorial power and leverage in plea bargaining.
This state of affairs might be reformed in several ways. Jurisdic-
tions might return to indeterminate sentencing policies that give
judges wide discretion over punishments, which would diminish the
ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-
minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_06.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BNA-V5DK]. For an
excellent survey and detailed documentation of explicit uses of sentence enhancements to
compel guilty pleas, see United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing
and summarizing cases and quoting explicit prosecutor assertions and policies).
Many courts note (and complain about) prosecutors explicit use of sentencing provisions
to induce guilty pleas or cooperation. See, e.g., United States v. Dotson, 513 F. Appx 221, 223
(3d Cir. 2013) (Although there was no plea agreement in this case, it was agreed that at the
time of sentencing, the government would withdraw one of the convictions from the infor-
mation to reduce Dotsons sentencing exposure from a mandatory life sentence to a mandatory
minimum sentence of twenty years imprisonment.); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293,
1298 (11th Cir. 2011) (observing that the non-application of [the prior felony information]
obviously was part of [the] plea agreement); United States v. Shaw, 426 F. Appx 810, 813
(11th Cir. 2011) (stating that the prosecutor informed the defendant that, if [he] went
forward with the suppression hearing, [the prosecutor] would file the § 851 notice seeking the
mandatory-minimum life sentence); United States v. Espinal, 634 F.3d 655, 659 (2d Cir.
2011) (stating that the government advised the defendant that if he did not plead guilty by
September 15, it would file a prior felony information, thus increasing the minimum sentence
from ten to twenty years); United States v. Harris, 394 F. Appx 676, 679-80 (11th Cir. 2010)
(noting that the government agreed to withdraw the notice of prior felonies to remove
mandatory life sentence only if the defendant pleaded guilty); United States v. Forrester, 616
F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing how the government offered to not file a § 851 notice
increasing defendants mandatory sentence if he accepted a package guilty plea offer, which
required that he and a co-defendant both accept the offer by 2:00 pm that same day);
Coleman v. United States, 339 F. Appx 643, 644 (7th Cir. 2009) (denying a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
motion for ineffective assistance of counsel for a case in which the attorney had advised the
defendant that the government would file a prior felony information unless he pleaded guilty);
United States v. Jenkins, 537 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008) (Here, the prosecutor agreed, as part
of his plea offer, to refrain from filing a section 851 enhancement information.); Vadas v.
United States, 527 F.3d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2007) (In exchange for the plea, ... [t]he government
also agrees to withdraw the Amended Second Offender Notice Information filed March 15,
2001 pursuant to ... Section 851.).
17. See BROWN, supra note 11, at 96-97.
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importance of prosecutorial charge selection. They might cull their
criminal codes to reduce the number of offenses and punishments
that apply to any given criminal act. Or they might somehow affect
a sea change in professional prosecutorial cultureperhaps by
transforming prosecution offices into nonpolitical civil service bu-
reaucraciesso that tactically selecting and adjusting charges
violates professional norms or administrative rules. Another possi-
bility, however, is at least as feasible as any of those (surely more so
than the last), and also wholly compatible with any of them. We
could increase legal regulation of prosecutorial charging decisions,
with judges taking on a modest, but meaningful, capacity to oversee
the most extreme and blatantly tactical exercises of prosecutorial
power. Regulation could take the form of statutory criteria,
administrative regulations, common law, or constitutional law. The
reluctance to this path, by courts and legislatures in nearly all U.S.
jurisdictions, is widespread, and to a significant degree, it has
become embedded in constitutional doctrines regarding separation
of powers at both the federal and state levels. Prosecutorial
discretion wholly free of judicial oversight, however, is not as long-
standing or as uniform a tradition as state and federal courts now
tend to assume.
The next two Sections sketch some of the history of executive
authority over criminal charging to make the case that, especially
in state criminal justice systems, a judicial power that is consistent
with constitutional structure and historical practice could play a
more meaningful role in regulating plea bargaining.
A. Exclusive Executive Authority and Separation of Powers
It has become a truism that [g]overnmental investigation and
prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.18 The
federal executives power during the prosecution process is at its
apex in the initial decision whether or not to initiate criminal charg-
es. The Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that the Federal
Constitution gives the Executive Branch ... exclusive authority and
absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.19 For
18. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 246 (2008) (citing United States v. Nixon,
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roughly the last century (but only that long), federal courts have
adopted the view that prosecutorial charging discretion is a special
province of the Executive Branch as an inference from the Constitu-
tions Take Care Clause, which assigns to the executive the duty to
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.20 On top of this
418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)); see, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) ([A]n agencys
refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a
prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indicta decision which has long been regarded
as the special province of the Executive Branch.); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693
(1974); see also State v. Faltynowicz, 660 P.2d 368, 377 (Wyo. 1983) (The prosecutive decision
traditionally has been exercised by the executive department. (citing Confiscation Cases, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1869))).
20. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). The first time the Supreme
Court linked federal prosecution discretion to the Take Care Clause was in Ponzi v.
Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922). The Attorney General is the head of the Department of
Justice. He is the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the United States in
protection of the interests of the United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of
offenses, be faithfully executed. Id. (internal citations omitted). A federal district court made
the connection a half century earlier. See United States v. Corrie, 25 F. Cas. 658, 668
(C.C.D.S.C. 1860) (No. 14,869); see also Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discre-
tion in Federal Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 22-23 (2009)
(discussing Corrie, Ponzi, and the evolution of prosecutorial power under the Take Care
Clause). For subsequent Supreme Court references, see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 464 (1996) (A selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial power over a
special province of the Executive.... They have this latitude because they are designated by
statute as the Presidents delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.) (citations omitted); Morrison, 487 U.S. at
656-57 (affirming independent prosecutor statute, inter alia, because the prosecutor remained
in the executive branch, despite Presidents lack of control, and judges did not supervise the
prosecutor); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 ([W]e recognize that an agencys refusal to institute
proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the
Executive Branch not to indicta decision which has long been regarded as the special
province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the
Constitution to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.).
Lower courts have also addressed distinctions in judicial and executive powers, defining
prosecution as part of the latter. See United States v. Scott, 631 F.3d 401, 406 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Under our system of separation of powers, prosecutors retain broad discretion to enforce
criminal laws because they are required to help the President take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.); United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 409 (7th Cir. 2009) (There is
nothing that this court either could or should do about the prosecutorial discretion that is
exercised at the charging stage.); United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 900 (7th Cir. 2008);
In re United States, 503 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d
432, 434 (7th Cir. 2007); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1973) (The suggestion
that the Judiciary be given responsibility for the appointment and supervision of a ...
[p]rosecutor ... is most unfortunate.... The Courts must remain neutral. Their duties are not
prosecutorial.).
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textual rationale, courts cite a practical one: they view enforcement
decisions as ill-suited to judicial review.21
In addition to the executives exclusive authority to commence a
prosecution, courts generally have presumed that the separate deci-
sion to terminate a prosecution also belongs to the executive branch.
That too can be inferred from the Take Care Clause, but it draws
additional support from common law tradition, which accorded
prosecutors exclusive control over the power to nolle prosequi, or
dismiss, charges that they earlier filed in court.22 Between the deci-
sions to initiate and terminate criminal charges, however, courts
have jurisdiction over the case, which enables judges to play some
role in supervising how the case proceeds and what the parties do
during those proceedings. [T]he primary constitutional duty of the
Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions23 gives judges
a basis for some authority over executive discretion during adjudica-
tion, even if they have none before that point. The Supreme Court
has used that authority, for example, to reject generalized claims of
executive privilege that would withhold evidence from a criminal
proceeding.24 During the adjudication process, the Court has
emphasized its less absolutist account of separation of powers
doctrine, which acknowledges the legitimacy of one branch having
21. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); see also United States v. Giannat-
tasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (Prosecutorial discretion resides in the
executive, not in the judicial, branch, and that discretion, though subject of course to judicial
review to protect constitutional rights, is not reviewable for a simple abuse of discretion.).
22. See Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 356, 364-66 (1838); 1 JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 496 (London, MacMillan
& Co. 1883); Charles H. Winfield, Nolle Prosequi, 5 CRIM. L. MAG. 1, 6-8 (1884). The only
traditional limit on nolle prosequi power comes at a later stage: once a jury is sworn, jeopardy
attaches and a prosecution-initiated dismissal can bar re-prosecution. Tuck, 37 Mass. (20
Pick.) at 365. Since the nineteenth century, states have varied their statutory rules on
whether a judge must approve dismissal or the prosecutors nolle pros power is unilateral, but
that distinction has little practical effect. Judges cannot command prosecutors to prosecute;
refusal to dismiss amounts only to the power to bar the prosecutors authority to re-file the
same charge later.
For a representative modern statement of prosecutors nolle pros power, see State v.
Vixamar, 687 So. 2d 300, 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting the prosecutors exclusive
discretion to decide whether a criminal case should be discontinued and in the absence of a
procedural rule authorizing judicial intervention (citing State v. Matos, 589 So.2d 1022 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991))).
23. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
24. Id.
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some input in a matter assigned primarily to another. [S]eparate
powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence,
but rather with interdependence and reciprocity.25
An example of the judicial authority in the context of prosecuto-
rial charging discretion that accords with this interdependent
conception of separation of powers is the Supreme Courts decision
in Blackledge v. Perry.26 Perry was convicted of misdemeanor as-
sault in a state court bench trial.27 State law provided for appeal in
the form of a de novo jury trial, which Perry demanded.28 While the
second trial was pending, the prosecutor indicted Perry under a
felony statute for the same conduct.29 Perry alleged the greater
charge was a vindictive response to his appeal that violated due
process, and the Supreme Court agreed.30 In order to prevent poten-
tial prosecutorial vindictiveness and protect a defendant from fear
of retaliationeven if that was not the prosecutors actual motive
Blackledge held that the Due Process Clause barred prosecutors
from responding to a defendants appeal by indicting him on a more
serious charge for the same conduct.31
Blackledge thus defined a constitutional limit on prosecutorial
charging discretion. More broadly, the Court recognized the judi-
ciarys competence to supervise criminal charging decisions in some
circumstances; not all charging decisions in every context are exclus-
ively executive. The executive branchs absolute discretion to decide
whether to prosecute a case32 need not be quite so absolute after all.
Or rather, properly understood, prosecutorial discretion need not be
viewed as incompatible with some constraints, at least at the outer
bounds, defined by legal standards and enforced by judicial review.
The same point can be drawn from equal protection doctrine, which
prohibits prosecutors from basing decisions to charge on intentional
25. Id.
26. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
27. Id. at 22.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id. at 25, 27.
31. Id. at 28-29.
32. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 454 (1869)).
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racial bias and gives courts the power to investigate and remedy
racially biased charges.33
Blackledge, however, is now only nominally good law and has
instead come to represent a doctrinal road not taken. The Supreme
Court effectively overturned Blackledge in later decisions that have
confined the Blackledge holding to its facts and imposed insuperable
proof burdens for vindictiveness claims in contexts other than the
unusual one of demands for de novo jury trials.34 Most importantly
in the plea bargaining context, the Court held in Bordenkircher v.
Hayes that Blackledge-style tactical charging decisions intended to
influence defendants choices about exercising other rightsin
Hayess case, the right to trialare wholly permissible in the con-
text of plea negotiations.35 That discretionary authority gives prose-
cutors an enormously powerful tool in the plea negotiation process.
The same is true of equal protection doctrine for similar reasons. In
United States v. Armstrong, the Court nominally recognized a stan-
dard by which courts guard against discriminatory prosecutions, but
then made its requirements insuperably difficult to meet.36 Beyond
these two constitutional doctrines, federal courts have not defined
other standards that would give courts meaningful authority to
review suspect prosecutorial charging decisions.37 State courts have
done little better. Likewise, Congress and state legislatures have
uniformly chosen not to specify such standards for judicial review by
statute.
As a result, prosecutors functionally have exclusive authority not
only over the initial decision to charge but also over critical post-
charging litigation tactics, especially with regard to changing or
dismissing charges. Courts concede the potential for abuse of power.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that [t]here is no doubt that
the breadth of discretion that our countrys legal system vests in
33. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996).
34. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 376-81 (1982) (imposing prohibitive
actual vindictiveness requirement for prosecutorial vindictiveness claims).
35. 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978) (approving prosecutors increase in charge severity as a
means to encourage plea bargaining).
36. 517 U.S. at 464-65.
37. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610-11, 613-14 (1985) (nominally acknow-
ledging limits on charging decisions motivated by defendants exercising fundamental rights
such as free speech, but deferring to prosecutorial discretion).
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prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both individ-
ual and institutional abuse.38 But the Court has been firm in its
view that this riskeven in light of the constitutional duty of the
Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions39does not
justify courts taking a meaningful role to guard against it, either as
a matter of constitutional law or of the judiciarys inherent supervi-
sory authority. In our system, so long as the prosecutor has prob-
able cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined
by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file ... generally rests entirely in his discretion.40 Lower
courts widely reaffirm this point in broad terms. A statement by the
Seventh Circuit is typical: A judge in our system does not have the
authority to tell prosecutors which crimes to prosecute .... Prosecuto-
rial discretion ... is not reviewable for a simple abuse of discretion.41
It may be that the powers accorded to each branch in the federal
system were intended to operate with interdependence and reci-
procity.42 But with regard to criminal prosecution, the executive
branch enjoys something close to absolute independence.43
B. History of Criminal Prosecution Authority
The common law tradition clearly accords the decision whether
or not to prosecute to prosecutorial as opposed to judicial control.44
But that does not necessarily mean that decisions to prosecute are
exclusively in the executives controlmuch less that they have been
so always and everywhere.45 Nor does it foreclose a meaningful
judicial role in supervising some aspects of prosecution decision
38. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365; see also Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463-65; Wayte, 470
U.S. at 607.
39. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
40. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364; see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995)
(noting a comparable level of faith in prosecutorial rectitude, and establishing a presumption
against prosecutors racial bias in striking potential jurors from the jury).
41. United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992); see also United States
v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
42. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
43. Id.
44. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.
45. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the power
of criminal prosecution has always and everywhereif conducted by government at allbeen
conducted never by the legislature, never by the courts, and always by the executive).
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making, as Blackledge once confirmed. The strongest version of the
claim that prosecution is always an activity exclusive to executive
officials is a comparatively recent one. Even within the federal
system, in which the case for that view rests on the firmest ground,
some early federal practices undermine it. In state justice systems,
as well as in common law systems outside the United States, the
claim of longstanding exclusive executive control over prosecution
simply does not hold.
C. Prosecutorial Power in the Federal System
The Federal Constitution creates a more unitary structure for the
executive branch than do most state constitutions, especially with
respect to criminal justice administration.46 Several historical prac-
tices suggest that the power of criminal prosecution was not always
understood as an exclusively executive power to the degree that
most courts today tend to assume. For one, private parties were
allowed to initiate federal actions closely analogous to criminal
prosecutionsqui tam actions.47 Those claims were understood as
quasi-criminal because the plaintiff brought them on behalf of the
federal government, the alleged victim of fraud or theft.48 Litigating
on the governments behalf, the successful qui tam relator shared
46. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing debate about the separation of the judiciary, legislature, and executive at the time
of the founding); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra, at 321 (James Madison) (In order to lay a
due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government,
which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty,
it is evident that each department should have a will of its own.); Rachel E. Barkow, Separa-
tion of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 992-94 (2006) (giving an overview
of separation of powers debates focused on criminal justice administration). Moreover, the
meaning and scope of the unitary executive created by the Federal Constitution remains a
topic of scholarly debate. Some of that debate focuses on federal prosecution authority.
Compare Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16-22 (1994) (arguing for executive authority outside the Presidents con-
trol), and Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 301-04 (1989) (expressing a similar, nonexclusive execu-
tive authority view of presidential power), with Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 538-39 (2005) (arguing for a strong unitary conception of executive
power, including presidential control over prosecution).
47. See Krent, supra note 46, at 296-303.
48. See id.
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any monetary award with the government.49 More significantly, fed-
eral crimes were sometimes prosecuted by state officials in state
courtsofficials clearly not under the control of the federal execu-
tive branch.50 Moreover, even the first federal prosecutors were not
clearly or formally under the Presidents control. The Judiciary Act
of 1789 created the office of the Attorney General as well as federal
district attorneys,51 but the latter did not report to the former until
1861.52 Beginning in 1820, district attorneys reported to the Trea-
sury Secretary, who in turn was required by statute to report to
Congress.53 The Department of Justice was not created until 1870.54
From evidence such as this, Larry Lessig and Cass Sunstein
concluded that the decision who should prosecute whom was a
decision the early Congresses at least thought far more subtle and
complex than do the believers in a strongly unitary executive.55
Some scholars disagree about the implications of this history in the
broader debate about presidential authority.56 But that debate is
only weakly related to the debates about the nature of judicial
49. While federal criminal law in its earliest decades evidenced no significant judicial
supervision in prosecution powers, the federal executive hardly maintained close or exclusive
control over enforcement. Federal crimes were sometimes prosecuted by state rather than
federal officials and occasionally by private parties, who could pursue close analogs to crim-
inal prosecutions in private qui tam actions. See id. at 300; see also Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 46, at 20. Even today federal courts have power to make interim appointments for federal
prosecution vacancies and to appoint special prosecutors to handle criminal contempt charges.
See 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (2012); see also 153 CONG. REC. 6599-600 (2007) (statement of Sen.
Diane Feinstein) (explaining that federal district courts have had authority to make interim
appointments to unfilled U.S. Attorney offices since at least 1863). On federal judicial
appointment of prosecutors for criminal contempt, see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton
et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 809-10, 814 (1987).
50. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 46, at 18-19; Krent, supra note 46, at 303-04.
51. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 35.
52. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 46, at 16-17.
53. See id.
54. See id.; Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on
Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 75 (1983) (The Attorney General did not con-
trol or supervise federal district attorneys; his function was merely to advise the President
and the Cabinet.); see also Prakash, supra note 46, at 555-57 (noting President Washington
lacked statutory authority to control federal district attorneys but nonetheless extensively dic-
tated instructions to them, and concluding that Washingtons control over district attorneys
and other federal attorneys was wide ranging and complete).
55. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 46, at 21; see also id. at 17-18 (discussing the history
of the Comptroller of the Treasury, who enjoyed some independence from presidential control,
as the first centralized federal prosecution authority).
56. See Prakash, supra note 46, at 521.
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oversight of prosecutorial discretion on constitutional grounds in the
manner of Blackledge orshould Congress so provideon statutory
grounds. More importantly, the degree of executive control over fed-
eral prosecutions is irrelevant to understandings of the scope of
executive authority in state criminal justice systems, in which more
than 90 percent of criminal cases are adjudicated.57
D. Prosecutorial Power in State Systems
State justice systems arise from state constitutions that differ in
significant ways from their federal counterpart, especially when it
comes to criminal justice administration. In general, many state
constitutions draw less rigid distinctions between executive, legis-
lative, and judicial roles than does the Federal Constitution.58 As a
result, a number of state courts have approved arrangements that
likely would be barred in the federal context, such as expansive
delegations of rule-making authority to agencies, or the appoint-
ment of legislators to executive boards.59 Several state courts exer-
cise greater authority than their federal counterparts by providing
advisory opinions to other branches, and many have constitutional
rule-making authority.60 Some state constitutions placed prosecutors
57. In 2006, state courts produced 1,132,290 convictions, compared to 79,725 convictions
in federal district courts during the same yearabout 7 percent of the state-court volume. See
UNIV. AT ALBANY, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: FELONY CONVICTIONS IN
STATECOURTS tbl.5.44.2006, http://albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5442006.pdf [https://perma.cc/
652Y-SHEL] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); id. at tbl.5.42.2006, http://www.albany.edu/source
book/pdf/t5242006.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD79-QKYZ] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). Federal
prisons held about 8 percent of all U.S. prison and jail inmates in 2003: 165,800 federal in-
mates compared to 1,912,800 inmates in state custody. UNIV. AT ALBANY: SOURCEBOOK CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: ADULTS UNDER CORRECTIONAL SUPERVISION tbl.6.2 (2003),
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t62.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QET-C5V9].
58. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 235-45 (2009)
(providing an overview of differences in state separation of powers law); see id. at 237 (noting
that forty state constitutions have explicit separation of powers provisions, unlike the Federal
Constitution); cf. Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 225 (1908) ([W]hen, as here,
a state constitution sees fit to unite legislative and judicial powers in a single hand, there is
nothing to hinder so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned.).
59. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 241. See generally Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safe-
guards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567 (1994)
(providing a comprehensive analysis of the delegation doctrine in all fifty states).
60. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 291, 296; see, e.g., In re Advisory Op. to the Governor, 732
A.2d 55, 62-64, 73 (R.I. 1999) (describing differences in state and federal separation of
powers). One implication of the nonunitary executive structure is that state courts may have
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in the judicial rather than the executive branch well into the
twentieth century; a few states still do, including Florida, Louisiana,
Tennessee, and Texas.61 Most states also depart from the federal
model of the unitary executive. In forty-three states, attorneys gen-
eral are directly elected.62 In the remainder they are appointed eith-
er by the Governor, the legislature, orin Tennesseethe state
supreme court.63 In most states, chief local prosecutors are also
independently elected, and state law frequently gives the attorney
general little authority to supervise or remove them.64
a different approach to issues of whether judicial supervision powers over prosecutors are of
such a nature that they impede the Presidentsor in the case of states, a Govern-
orsability to perform his constitutional duty, than the Supreme Court in Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
61. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 17-18 (creating elected state attorneysand public defend-
ersin the Judiciary article that also creates courts); LA. CONST. art. V, §§ 18-20, 22, 26
(defining courts, elected judges, and elected district attorneys within the judicial branch);
TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (providing for locally elected prosecutors and an Attorney General
appointed by the state supreme court within the Judicial Department); TEX. CONST. art. V,
§ 21 (providing for the election of county or district attorneys); State v. Hayes, 75 So. 3d 8, 12
n.1 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that unlike federal law, prosecutorial power under the Louisi-
ana Constitution is in the judicial, not the executive, branch); Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d
246, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (By establishing the office of county attorney under Article
V, the authors of the Texas Constitution placed those officers within the Judicial department.
That office is vested with the constitutional duty to represent the State in state courts
(quoting TEX. CONST. art. V, § 21)). Connecticut amended its constitution in the 1980s to
follow the federal model more closely and locate prosecutors in the executive branch. See
CONN. CONST. art. IV, amended by CONN. CONST. art. XXIII. Until then, prosecutors were ap-
pointed by judges. GEORGE COPPOLO, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH, 2005-R-0139, APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF STATES ATTORNEY AND STATES ATTORNEYS
(2005), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0139.htm [https://perma.cc/T3E6-RHEA].
62. Attorney General, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Attorney_General [https://
perma.cc/J8X6-GEB4] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (noting that forty-three states elect the At-
torneys General, and Governors appoint Attorneys General in Alaska, Hawaii, New Jersey,
and Wyoming).
63. See ME. CONST. art. IX, § 11 (legislature appoints Attorney General); N.H. CONST. pt.
II, art. 46 (Governor and the Executive Council appoint the Attorney General together); TENN.
CONST. art. VI, § 5 (state supreme court appoints Attorney General).
64. See generally Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J.
1528 (2012) (describing prosecution systems in various states and the origins of U.S. election
of prosecutors). Many states vest the duty to prosecute expressly with local prosecutors rather
than the Attorney General. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney General §§ 15, 34 (2016); 7A C.J.S.
Attorney General § 67 (2016). Some state Attorneys General have formal authority to super-
vise or take over local prosecutions, but they exercise it only rarely; others lack even formal
power save in special circumstances, such as authorization by the Governor. For statutes
limiting Attorney General power to intervene in local prosecution, see, for example, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-31-101(1)(a) (West 2015); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(2) (McKinney 2015). For
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In addition to these contemporary differences, the history of pro-
secution authority and practice in the states also differed sharply
from the federal experience, especially in the nations first several
decades. In the colonial era and roughly the first half century of the
republic, public prosecutors in state systems were appointed in
various waysby governors, legislatures, and in some jurisdictions
by judges.65 Often part-time or short-term officers, they were com-
monly paid by the case or by the conviction.66 Full-time public
prosecutors were not widespread, even in larger cities, until the
examples of statutes authorizing general or supervisory power to the Attorney General, see,
for example, CAL. GOVT CODE § 12550 (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.10.090 (West
2015). For decisions describing limits on powers of the Attorney General under state law, see
People v. Knippenberg, 757 N.E.2d 667, 672 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Johnson v. Pataki, 691
N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (N.Y. 1997) (describing Governors statutory authority to replace locally
elected prosecutors and the state Attorney Generals power to take over local prosecutions
only after authorization from the Governor); Commonwealth v. Mulholland, 702 A.2d 1027,
1037 (Pa. 1997).
Legislation often authorizes local prosecutors within a state to devise prosecution policies
independently, although statewide prosecutor associations can exert some influence toward
more uniform practices. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901 (West 2015) (requiring local
prosecutors to devise policies regarding domestic violence prosecutions); WISC. STAT. ANN.
§ 968.075(3) (West 2015) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.08401 (repealed 2011) (requiring that
[t]he state attorney in each judicial circuit adopt uniform criteria for charging under
certain sentence-enhancement statutes, and each circuits policy to be on file with the state
prosecutor association, but prohibiting judicial enforcement of such policies).
65. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 64, at 1537 (noting judicial appointment of prosecutors in
Kentucky and New York, and legislative or gubernatorial appointments elsewhere); see also
GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAININGS TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA
247 n.13 (2003) (describing an 1809 Massachusetts statute that transferred power to appoint
county attorneys from the Governor to the court); MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L. MIRSKY,
JURY TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY 35 (2005) (describing early systems of
judicial or gubernatorial appointment of prosecutors until the office became an elected one in
1847); id. at 28, 35 (noting courts appointed private lawyers as substitute prosecutors when
district attorneys failed to appear); id. at 35 (indicating that before 1847, the district attorney
was appointed by the Governors Council of Appointment and approved by the judges of the
Court of General Sessions); cf. JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCE-
MENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 367 (1944) (noting that in
Colonial New York, judges as well as the Governor ordered prosecutions and nolle prosequi);
ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA,
1800-1880, at 58, 79-80, 149-58 (1989) (describing judicial management of crime investigation
and criminal enforcement, especially on temperance issues; the role of public prosecutors in
courts dominated by private prosecutors; and reform that changed the district attorneys office
into an elected one after 1850).
66. NICOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940, at 255-94, 363-65 (2013) (describing the history of
prosecutor pay by the case or conviction).
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mid-nineteenth century. Most states instituted direct, local election
of prosecutors (as well as judges) during a wave of state constitu-
tional reforms in the 1840s-1860s.67
Elections failed in many places, however, to reduce political party
influence.68 Today, forty-five of the fifty states follow that model, a
regime of highly decentralized law enforcement and policy making
sharply different from the unitary executive model in which federal
prosecutors are under presidential control through the Attorney
General.69 Of the five states that do not elect local prosecutors, three
allow the Governor to nominate candidates who must be confirmed
by the legislature.70 Two of the smallest states, Delaware and Rhode
67. JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLES COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPEN-
DENCE IN AMERICA 6, 57-102 (2012) (describing this era of state constitutional reform and
explaining that reformers hoped that electing state judges would make the judiciary
independent from Governors and legislatures). During this era, the state constitutions of
Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia made
local prosecutors elected positions. See, e.g., IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 11; MD. CONST. of
1851, art. III (forbidding the creation of state Attorney General office); id. art. V; MICH.
CONST. of 1850, art. VIII, § 1; id. art. X, § 3; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. X, § 1; N.C. CONST. of
1868, art. IV, § 29; VA. CONST. of 1850, art. VI, § 19; see also MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra
note 65, at 25-42 (describing New Yorks early systems for judicial and gubernatorial appoint-
ment of prosecutors, until elections of prosecutors began in 1847); STEINBERG, supra note 65,
at 157-58 (describing Pennsylvanias shift to election of judges in 1851 and Philadelphias first
election of the district attorney in 1850).
68. See MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 65, at 198, 310-14 (describing politicized
judges in nineteenth-century New York); RAYMOND MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSE-
CUTION 74-94 (1929); ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 183 (Transaction
Publishers 1998) (1930) (criticizing the intimate connection of the prosecutors office with
politics); STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 92-96 (describing courts in nineteenth-century Phila-
delphia); Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of Public Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L.REV. 1309, 1331, 1391 (2002) (describing the publics view on plea-
bargaining in New York City).
69. See generally Ellis, supra note 64 (describing the origins of U.S. election of prosecutors
and systems in various states). On local prosecutors plenary authority and limits on super-
vision by state attorneys general, see supra note 64.
70. Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey (and the federal district, Washington, D.C.) do
not elect prosecutors. STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEPT OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 213799, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/psc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS6Q-QUKV]; see also Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor
Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 589 (2009). On the federal system, see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 541-542 (2012) (specifying that chief federal prosecutors are appointed by the President to
four-year terms subject to Senate confirmation andlike their assistant prosecutorsserve
at the pleasure of the president). For Connecticut, whose prosecutors are appointed through
an independent commission, see About the Criminal Justice Commission, ST. CONN., http://
www.ct.gov/cjc/cwp/view.asp?a=1361&q=258216 [https://perma.cc/ZFV6-BFD4] (last modified
Apr. 15, 2011, 12:18 PM) (noting that Article XXIII of the state constitution establishes the
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Island, elect an Attorney General who appoints the statewide prose-
cution staff.71
More notably for understanding the scope of executive authority,
some states followed English practice and relied significantly on pri-
vate prosecutors to initiate and litigate criminal charges. In states
such as New York and Pennsylvania, this remained the practice into
the latter part of the nineteenth century, well after the advent of
elected prosecutors.72 Public prosecutors did not gain their full
monopoly over criminal charging in some states until a century or
more after the nations founding, although they typically had the
authority to take overand either press or dismissa private pro-
secution. That is still the case for public prosecutors in common law
jurisdictions outside of the United States.73 Consequently, courts
tended to play a somewhat greater supervisory role over prosecu-
tors.74 The early power of appointment in a few places gave them
influence, and judges had various means by which to somewhat
check private prosecutors. As a threshold matter, criminal com-
plaints could proceed only if a judge found probable cause (except
where serious offenses had to go through grand juries). Additionally,
private prosecutors who lost might be ordered to pay the defendants
costs or face liability for malicious prosecution.75
Moreover, many states adopted statutes in this era that gave
judges a new power that prosecutors had exercised exclusively at
common law. New statutes in most states required judicial approval
of prosecutors nolle pros requests.76 These rules, initially adopted
Commission and its power to appoint prosecutors).
71. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2505 (West 2015); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-9 (West
2015).
72. See MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 65, at 35 (discussing New York practice in the
nineteenth century); STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 58, 78 (describing private prosecutors and
judicial supervision of prosecution in nineteenth-century Philadelphia).
73. See infra Part II.
74. In the 1800s in New York City, judges had power to appoint private attorneys when
public prosecutors failed to appear. See MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 65, at 35.
75. See STEINBERG, supra note 65, at 184 (discussing an 1859 law that empowered jurors
to order that litigation costs be split between defendant and prosecutor); John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 220-25 (2013) (discussing
prosecutor liability for malicious prosecution in the nineteenth century).
76. See Annotation, Power of Court to Enter Nolle Prosequi or Dismiss Prosecution, 69
A.L.R. 240-44 (1930) [hereinafter Power of Court] (Under statutes in some states, however,
and independently of statute in a few jurisdictions where long practice has established the
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in the early nineteenth century, gave judges a different kind of
authority over public and private prosecutorsthe power to compel
enforcement, rather than the power to bar charges as unfounded or
to facilitate sanctions for frivolous charges. Whatever legislatures
intention in creating this judicial veto on prosecutorial discretion,
courts in every state have effectively rejected it.77 Perhaps because
public prosecutors gained both exclusive control of criminal charging
and democratic legitimacy from their elective status, courts have
uniformly interpreted these statutes to require exceeding judicial
deference to prosecutors nolle pros requests, rendering judicial
authority on this point practically irrelevant.78 A smaller number of
state legislaturesat least a dozenhave additionally empowered
rule, the prosecuting attorney does not have the power to enter a nolle prosequi without the
consent of the court. The present annotation is devoted to a discussion of the question of
whether or not the court has the power, or the right, to enter a nolle prosequi.) (internal cita-
tions omitted); see also ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DIS-
CRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 14 (1981).
77. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 76, at 14-15 (discussing the initial purposes of the statutes and
criticizing courts for abandoning their statutory authority to prosecutors); POUND, supra note
68, at 187.
78. See Power of Court, supra note 76 (providing a broad overview of state nolle pros laws).
Enactment of these statutes often predated prosecutorial elections and initially was a tool for
judges to control private prosecutors or public ones they had appointed. New York granted
courts nolle pros authority in 1829, during the states era of private and judicially appointed
prosecutors. MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 65, at 35 n.112 (citing 1829 Revised Statutes
of the State of New York, Title IV, Sec. 68, p.730 & Sec. 54., p.726). The federal rule is FED.
R. CRIM. P. 48(a), first enacted in 1944. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) advisory committees note to
1994 amendment. For examples of courts interpreting their authority over nolle pros requests
to require deference to prosecutors preferences, see, for example, Genesee Cty. Prosecutor v.
Genesee Circuit Judge, 215 N.W.2d 145 (Mich. 1974). For federal cases, see, for example,
United States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706,
710-11 (4th Cir. 1983); Dawsey v. Govt of V.I., 931 F. Supp. 397, 401-06 (D.V.I. 1996); United
States v. Smith, 853 F. Supp. 179 (M.D.N.C. 1994).
A standard explanation for deference is that judges lack means to compel prosecutors to
litigate charges at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Con-
tractors Assn, 228 F. Supp. 483, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Even were leave of Court to the
dismissal of the indictment denied, the Attorney General would still have the right to ... in the
exercise of his discretion, decline to move the case for trial. The Court in that circumstance
would be without power to issue a mandamus or other order to compel prosecution of the
indictment, since such a direction would invade the traditional separation of powers doc-
trine.). But judges have options short of mandamus. Presumably they could hold prosecutors
in contempt for failure to appear, as they could for all other attorneys. And whenever
prosecutors retain an interest in charges they seek to dismiss, judges could incentivize them
by ruling that failure to litigate charges results (as for civil parties) in forfeiture of the claim
or dismissal with prejudice.
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judges to dismiss criminal charges on their own, without the prose-
cutors request or consent, in the interest of justice or on similarly
broad grounds.79 Here too, however, state appellate courts over-
whelmingly seem to have narrowly construed judicial power granted
by these statutes, and trial judges seem to rarely use them. On the
other hand, a Massachusetts statute that authorizes judges to
dismiss charges over a prosecutors objection seems to get more use.
That provision empowers and authorizes judges to dismiss charges
without the prosecutions consent if a defendant enters a conditional
guilty plea and then completes a supervised probation period with
terms set by the court.80 At least a few other states grant courts
similar authority.81
From the foregoing, it should be easy to see that not all aspects of
prosecution authority have always been insulated from judicial
supervision. The decision whether to charge was not exclusively
executive; it was also sometimes exercised by private parties.82
Moreover, courts had meaningful tools for input on whether a
prosecutors preferred charge should proceed or be dismissed, and
79. See generally Valena Elizabeth Beety, Judical Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 80
MO. L. REV. 629 (2015) (collecting and discussing statutes in at least thirteen states that
authorize judges to dismiss criminal charges in the interests of justice). Among the statutes
Beety considers are: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3504 (2015);
MINN. STAT. § 631.21 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-401 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 815
(2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.755 (2015); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 43(c); IOWA R. CIV. P. 2.33(1); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 2015); P.R. R. CRIM. P. 247(b); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 25;
WASH. R. CRIM. P. 8.3. Id. at 656 n.154; see also State v. McDonald, 137 P. 362, 363 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1914) (noting the courts statutory authority to dismiss charges over prosecutors
objection).
For the standard position on this point, see, for example, State v. Vixamar, 687 So. 2d 300,
303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ([It is] the prosecutors exclusive discretion to decide whether
a criminal case should be discontinued and in the absence of a procedural rule authorizing
judicial intervention. (citing State v. Matos, 589 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991))).
80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 18 (West 2015); see also Commonwealth v. Powell,
901 N.E.2d 686, 689-90 (Mass. 2009) (discussing this statute and the history of this pro-
cedure). The practice authorized by the statute seems to have originated as a judicial
innovation incorporated into state common law. See Commonwealth v. Brandano, 269 N.E.2d
84, 88 (Mass. 1971) (stating that trial court must hold adversary hearing before dismissing
criminal charges over prosecutors objection).
81. See, e.g., State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a judge
may, over the prosecutors objection, stay adjudication upon defendants guilty plea in special
circumstances). But see State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 541 (Minn. 1996) (finding no special
circumstances like those in Krotzer and reversing trial courts stay of adjudication over
prosecutors objection).
82. See supra notes 47-48, 72 and accompanying text.
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whether malice played a role in charging decisions.83 From this
history and states distinctive constitutional structures, one would
expect to see some state constitutional law, common law, or statutes
that sustained a Blackledge-like standard through which courts
could play a balancing role and guard against outlier instances of
prosecutorial vindictiveness or abuse of discretion. For the most
part, however, one does not. State criminal justice systems over-
whelmingly follow the federal model on separation of powers and
treat most aspects of prosecutorial decision making as an executive
activity immune from judicial interference.84
Some examples make the point. The vast majority of states
strengthen executive authority by prohibiting jury instructions
without the prosecutors consent on a species of lesser-included
offensesthose that fit the trial evidence but are not necessarily
included within the elements of the charged offense. To do other-
wise, in the words of the California Supreme Court, may violate
separation of powers by usurp[ing] the prosecutions exclusive
charging discretion.85 Likewise, many states cite separation of
powers concerns in barring judges from dismissing valid charges
before trial.86 In Texas, the states highest criminal court has taken
this view and held that trial judges lack authority to invad[e] the
exclusive province of prosecutors by dismissing charges with preju-
dice even though Texas prosecutors are constitutionally within the
83. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., State v. Perleberg, 736 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting ju-
dicial review of prosecutors choice to charge conduct as several offenses rather than a single
one because a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of the charging function and
ordinarily, under the separation-of-powers doctrine, a court should not interfere with the
prosecutors exercise of that discretion absent special circumstances (quoting Foss, 556
N.W.2d at 540)); see also People v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., 12 Ill. App. 263, 264-65
(App. Ct. 1882) (stating, in one of the earliest state decisions describing a prosecutors wide
discretion, that the prosecutor is charged by law with large discretion in prosecuting
offenders against the law. He may commence public prosecutions, in his official capacity by
information and he may discontinue them when, in his judgment, the ends of justice are
satisfied). For an overview of U.S. prosecutorial power and the lack of judicial supervision,
see Abby L. Dennis, Note, Reining in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial Oversight and the
Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 134-45 (2007).
85. People v. Birks, 960 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Cal. 1998); id. at 1088 & n.17 (concluding most
states follow the same rule); id. at 1089-90 (discussing prosecution authority and separation
of powers).
86. See Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 608 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Mass. 1993).
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Judicial Department.87 For the same reasons of exclusive prose-
cutorial discretion, Texas trial judges have no authority to require
that prosecutors subpoena their trial witnesses, even though a
subpoena is necessary in order for a defendant to raiseand a trial
judge to rule ona pretrial challenge to whether a witness may
testify.88
Many state court statements on the parameters of prosecutorial
authority are as sweepingly phrased as those of any federal court.
Troublingly, the implication is that separation of powers jurispru-
dence would bar even legislation authorizing even modest judicial
review of prosecutorial discretion for abuse of discretion or an even
more deferential standard. In most cases, because no such statute
was at issue, this constitutional limit is only implicitas in the
California rule on lesser-included offenses,89 or the Texas decision
on witness subpoenas.90 Case law directly addressing the constitu-
tionality of statutes that give judges some role regarding prosecu-
tion decision making is rare because such legislation is rare. One
example, however, comes from Wyoming. The Wyoming Supreme
Court invalidated a statute that had granted courts authority to
order a prosecutor to pursue a charge when the judge found prob-
able cause for a crime such as, in that case, in-court perjury by a
police officer.91 The court concluded that even the legislature could
not alter the state separation of powers implication that the charg-
ing decision is properly within the scope of duty of the executive
branch.92
On the other hand, some states have recognized the judicial
capacity for a modest supervisory role over critical aspects of prose-
cutorial discretion. Statutory authority noted above for judges to
87. State ex rel. Holmes v. Denson, 671 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (holding
that the trial judge usurped his authority in invading the exclusive province of the [prose-
cutor]).
88. In re State, 390 S.W.3d 439, 442-44 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that requiring the
district attorney to issue subpoenas for its witnesses invaded exclusive prosecutorial discre-
tion); see also State ex rel. Holmes v. Salinas, 784 S.W.2d 421, 427-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)
(holding that magistrate cannot issue orders restraining prosecutors from presenting evidence
to a grand jury).
89. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
91. In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 871-73 (Wyo. 1984).
92. Id. at 873.
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dismiss charges filed by prosecutors, or to reject their requests to
nolle pros charges, are the clearest examples.93 Despite the general
pattern of judicial deference to prosecutors, some state courts have
departed from federal conceptions of separation of powers. Notwith-
standing its rule against judges adding lesser-included-offense
instructions at trial, the California Supreme Court has concluded
that dismissal of charges is a judicial function.94 Further, the court
cautioned that granting prosecutors a veto over dismissal decisions
could violate separation of powers,95 and it invalidated statutory
provisions that required prosecutorial consent before judges reduced
certain offenses to misdemeanors, sentenced offenders to drug treat-
ment in lieu of prison, or struck prior convictions that trigger
enhanced punishment.96 Perhaps the strongest assertion of judicial
authority on state constitutional grounds comes from the New
Jersey Supreme Court in the context of sentencing. The New Jersey
legislature gave prosecutors the power to invoke mandatory sen-
tence termsas well as to control access to pretrial diversion
programsas part of their charging discretion.97 The states high
court held that those statutes are constitutional only if prosecutors
are guided in those decisions by statewide charging and plea
bargaining guidelines, which courts use as a basis to review pro-
secutorial decisions.98
93. See supra notes 76, 78 and accompanying text.
94. People v. Superior Court, 917 P.2d 628, 634 (Cal. 1996).
95. Id. at 636-37 (concluding that, in California, disposition of pending charges is a
judicial function; a statute that gives prosecutors control over judicial dismissal of allegations
affecting sentencing would violate separation of powers); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385
(West 2015) (The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the
application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be
dismissed.).
96. People v. Navarro, 497 P.2d 481, 485, 488-89 (Cal. 1972) (invalidating statute giving
prosecutor power to veto a judicial decision to commit a convicted defendant to a drug
treatment program in lieu of prison); Esteybar v. Mun. Court, 485 P.2d 1140, 1141 & n.1 (Cal.
1971) (holding that a statutory scheme that granted magistrates the authority to reduce a
wobbler offense to a misdemeanor but conditioning the exercise of this power on the approv-
al of the prosecutor violated separation of powers); People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993, 997 (Cal.
1970) (holding that a statutory provision giving prosecutors the power to preclude the court
from exercising its discretion to strike a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing violated
separation of powers doctrine).
97. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:35-12, 2C:43-12 (West 2015).
98. See State v. Brimage, 706 A.2d 1096, 1106 (N.J. 1998) (reviewing a prosecutors deci-
sion to invoke statutory provision for mandatory sentence in context of a plea bargain); State
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Statutes that grant judges powers other than dismissing charges
or reducing sanctions are less common, especially on decisions that
intersect with prosecutorial charging discretion. In a few states,
statutes mandate that prosecutors provide reasons for decisions not
to file charges after a judge has found probable cause at a prelimi-
nary examination.99 Judges review those reasons andif they are
insufficientcan order the prosecutor to pursue the charges.100 Note
that this applies only to a specific subset of all prosecution decisions
to not pursue chargesa distinctive group for which judges have
considerable pre-charging access to case facts. Like the authority to
disapprove prosecutors nolle pros motions, these statutes effectively
give judges the power to order prosecutors to pursue charges that
they would prefer to dropthe very core of the decision whether or
not to prosecute that Bordenkircher declared to be entirely in [the
prosecutors] discretion.101 Presumably for that reason, courts in the
few states with such statutes have interpreted the power narrowly
and seem to exercise it sparingly.
v. Baynes, 690 A.2d 594 (N.J. 1997) (reviewing a prosecutors reasons for charging the defen-
dant instead of diverting him into a drug program); see also Commcns Workers of Am. v.
Florio, 617 A.2d 223, 231-32 (N.J. 1992) (describing the New Jersey Governor as an unusually
strong model for the state executive, and noting that courts scrutinize encroachment on
power of one branch by another more closely than abdications of power). See generally PETER
C. HARVEY ET AL., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF N.J., BRIMAGE GUIDELINES 2 (rev.
2004), http://www.state.nj.us/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/brimage_all.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z2W5-7BK8]. New Jersey is one of very few states with a unitary executive similar to the
federal model, including appointed prosecutors under the authority of an appointed Attorney
General. See John J. Farmer, Jr., The Evolution of New Jerseys Gubernatorial Power, 25
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 5 (2001).
99. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.41 (West 2015) (stipulating that in certain cases,
prosecutors must file reasons for not charging, and that a court, upon review, can order
prosecutor to file charge); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1606 (West 2015) (same); see also COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-209 (West 2015) (same); PA. R. CRIM. P. 506 (requiring prosecutors to
give court-reviewable reasons for decisions not to prosecute upon a private complaint).
Because this statutory scheme applies only to a small subset of cases, this judicial power is
narrower than that exercised by English courts as discussed below.
100. See People v. Stewart, 217 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that [a]
circuit judge does not enjoy supervisory power over a prosecuting attorney. He may reverse a
magistrates decision only for abuse of discretion (quoting Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee
Circuit Judge, 215 N.W.2d 145, 147 (Mich. 1974))). But see State v. Sanchell, 216 N.W.2d 504,
508 (Neb. 1974) (requiring court approval of agreement between defendant and prosecutor
that charges be dismissed).
101. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978). Bordenkircher makes its claim
about prosecutorial discretion in our system, implicitly assuming all American jurisdictions,
state and federal, to be the same on this point. See id.
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Finally, at least two states have a different kind of restriction on
charging discretion. In New York and California, statutes restrict
nominally if not effectivelyprosecutors power to reduce or dismiss
charges after the initial indictment when they normally would have
done so as part of a plea bargain.102 In both states the statutes have
been interpreted in ways that make them easy to avoid, resulting in
the statutes having little practical force.103 Both states have plenty
of plea bargains, and appellate decisionswhich do not necessarily
tell the whole storyprovide little evidence that courts rely on the
statutes to limit prosecutors charge bargaining. Still, the longstand-
ing existence of the statutes confirms their state constitutionality;
these limits on prosecution decisions to reduce or dismiss charges do
not unduly interfere with prosecutors executive prerogative.
E. Conclusion
In sum, compared to the federal system, many states have dis-
tinctive constitutional structures and long histories of prosecution
by actors other than executive branch officials. Those differences
should lead states away from the error of viewing all critical aspects
of prosecutorial discretion as exclusively executive and immune to
any judicial input. Some state statutes and doctrines demonstrate
albeit mostly in marginal termssome possibilities for judicial
checks on prosecutorial authority. There are good reasons to
question the strong conception of separation of powers doctrine in
the federal context, where it prohibits meaningful judicial oversight
of prosecutorial discretion about filing, amending, or dismissing
charges. That kind of constitutional barrier has an even weaker ba-
sis in many states, notwithstanding the overly broad assumptions
by state and federal courts alike about our system of criminal
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 2015); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10 (McKinney
2015).
103. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 223 Cal. Rptr. 66, 72 n.11 (Ct. App. 1986) (Section 1192.7
applies only to bargains concerning indictments or informations and thus does not limit plea
bargaining concerning charges contained in complaints before the municipal or justice
court.); People v. Moquin, 570 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the criminal
procedure law provides courts no authority to vacate an illegal plea bargain after it has been
imposed).
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prosecution.104 In sum, state executive authority over criminal
charging can accommodate specific legislative standards foror
checks onthat authority and a deferential role for the judiciary de-
fined by legislative or even judicially defined standards.
In fact, even in the federal context there should be no dispute that
separation of powers doctrine permits legislatively authorized judi-
cial review. Congress surely can enact statutory criteria, guidelines,
or mandates for executive branch enforcement actions and also
provide for judicial review under those rules. This kind of statutorily
authorized judicial review already exists for certain civil enforce-
ment decisions made by federal executive branch departments.105
Charging decisions are not ill-suited to judicial review as a federal
constitutional matter in all circumstances, and state constitutions
are unlikely to present a stronger barrier.106 At most, that assump-
tion is true only as a practical or prudential matter when no statute
or regulation provides a basis for review, although courts are capa-
ble of fashioning meaningful standards as a matter of constitutional
or common law. Judges are wholly competent to review some
aspects of government enforcement decisions under sufficiently spe-
cific legal criteria, even if only to guard against extreme exercises of
authority. Short of a wholesale revision of expansive criminal codes
and determinate sentencing laws, some kind of review along those
lines is the only route to meaningful regulation of plea bargaining
104. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364-65; see also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ([M]any believe that without [plea bargaining] ... our system
of criminal justice would grind to a halt.); cf. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., No. 66193,
2014 WL 6210281, at *2 (Nev. Nov. 13, 2014) (holding the state trial court abused its discre-
tion in allowing defendant to plead guilty, withdraw his guilty plea, and plead guilty to a
lesser offense (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (Whether to
prosecute and what charge to file or bring before the grand jury are decisions that generally
rest in the prosecutors discretion.))).
105. See generally Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830-34 (1985); Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Assn of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 52 (1983) (requiring
federal administrative agency to provide rational reasons for rescinding motor vehicle safety
requirements in light of legislation authorizing judicial review); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421
U.S. 560, 563 n.2, 566 (1975) (holding that, under the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 482which requires that the Secretary of Labor investigate a
complaint of labor law violations and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation
... has occurred ... he shall ... bring a civil action against the labor organizationunion
members may seek judicial review of the secretarys decision not to initiate civil enforcement
action).
106. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
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and to leaving executive power to be checked solely by the political
process.
II. REGULATION OF PROSECUTORS IN COMMON LAW SYSTEMS
Regulation or judicial supervision of prosecutorial conduct is
hardly a novel idea. Some civil law jurisdictions have long had a re-
quirement of mandatory prosecution when evidence is sufficient.107
Some nations, such as Germany, amended mandatory prosecution
to authorize prosecutorial discretion for some crimes, although ap-
parently the mandate remains a significant norm that somewhat
constrains exercises of prosecutorial discretion.108 By contrast,
prosecutors throughout common law jurisdictions have always had
wide discretion over whether to pursue charges well grounded in
evidence.109 There are few restraints on authority by statutes,
constitutional doctrine, or common law.110 But that freedom for
107. Prosecutorial discretion is also the rule in some civil law systems such as Denmark,
France, and the Netherlands. Germany, Italy, and Poland are among civil law jurisdictions
with mandatory prosecution rules for some classes of offenses. See THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012) (providing a
summary of prosecutorial practices across nations); James Q. Whitman, No Right Answer?,
in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 371,
377-87 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008) (noting the differing civil law and common law
understandings of the legality principle and trust in judges and prosecutors); see also JULIA
FIONDA, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 9 (1995) (discussing
the legality principle, which excludes all discretion from the early stages of the criminal
process. Under this principle, prosecution of all offences where sufficient evidence exists of
the guilt of the defendant is compulsory); Isabel Kessler, A Comparative Analysis of
Prosecution in Germany and the United Kingdom: Searching for Truth or Getting a Convic-
tion?, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE
213, 216 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2008) (discussing Germanys opportunity
principle that grants prosecutors broad discretion for low-level crimes but less discretion for
more serious offenses).
108. See FIONDA, supra note 107, at 11 (describing historical reasons for Germanys restric-
tions on prosecutorial power).
109. See, e.g., Smedleys Ltd. v. Breed [1974] AC 839 at 856 (Eng.) (It has never been the
rule of this country ... that criminal offences must automatically be the subject of prosecu-
tion.).
110. For a classic analysis of American prosecutorial discretion to charge and to decline to
charge compared to other officials, see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188, 207-08 (1969) (The affirmative power to prosecute is enormous,
but the negative power to withhold prosecution may be even greater, because it is less protec-
ted against abuse.... The plain fact is that more than nine-tenths of local prosecutors
decisions are supervised or reviewed by no one.).
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prosecutorial authority did not arise from a trust in the public
prosecutors or executive officials. England relied heavily on private
prosecutors to a much greater degree, and for much longer, than did
any American state jurisdiction.111 The primary explanation for why
common law jurisdictions never developed legal parameters for pro-
secutorial authority to the degree that many civil law jurisdictions
did is that common law systems relied primarily on the structure of
the adjudication process to oversee government officials: lay juries
provided the main safeguard against abusive prosecutions.112
Democratic review rather than judicial review checks prosecutors.
Times have changed. Plea bargaining has marginalized jury trials
as the means of adjudication. But what has replaced the jury as an
institutional safeguard? In American jurisdictions, very little
despite a deep-seated national skepticism of government power and
the monopolization of prosecutorial authority by government
officials. Courts have done little to develop bases for judicial review
of charging decisions and bargaining tactics. Legislatures have
granted prosecutors greater authority through determinate sentenc-
ing laws, which give prosecutors power over punishment terms, and
through expansive criminal codes that multiply charging options.113
111. Private prosecution still exists in England. The primary prosecution agency, the
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), was created in only 1985. See Prosecution of Offences Act
1985, c. 23, § 1 (Eng.); ANDREW ASHWORTH & MIKE REDMAYNE, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 222-23
(4th ed. 2010). The Director of Public Prosecutions was created in 1879 but did not handle
most prosecutions until the CPS was created. See Glanville Williams, The Power to Prosecute,
1955 CRIM. L. REV. 596, 601-03 (Eng.). In the intervening century, police came to dominate
filing of criminal charges, supplemented by private prosecutionsa system that eventually
was viewed as providing insufficient supervision of charging decisions by police. Id.
112. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness
Testimony, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 392 (2012) (The jury system gives lay people
an important participatory role, designed to protect the accused, in the criminal justice
system.); see also Frederic N. Smalkin, Judicial Control of Juries and Just Results in the
Common Law System: A Historical Perspective, 46 IUS GENTIUM 105, 105, 109-112 (2015).
Formerly, the grand jury was an additional check on the initiation of serious charges, but it
has been abolished in England and many U.S. states. In the jurisdictions where the grand
jury remains, rule changes have largely converted it to prosecutors handmaidens. On the
weaknesses of grand juries, see Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot)
Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260 (1995). For an argument that juries have little
indirect effect on bargaining, see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
113. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 571 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating
that mandatory minimum statutes transfer sentencing power to prosecutors, who can
determine sentences through the charges they decide to bring); see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
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On this front, however, the evolution of English and American crim-
inal justice has diverged. And for that reason it is worth considering
English practice for roads not taken to the regulation of plea bar-
gaining by state and federal law.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PROSECUTION DECISIONS IN ENGLAND
The baseline rule regarding English courts oversight of charging
decisions is, much like the American rule, highly deferential: [J]u-
dicial review of a prosecutorial decision is available but is a highly
exceptional remedy.114 Like its American counterparts, the English
judiciary recognizes that prosecution decisions typically turn not on
an analysis of the relevant legal principles but on the exercise of an
informed judgment of how a case against a particular defendant, if
brought, would be likely to fare in the context of a criminal trial
§ 2C:35-7 (West 2015) (prohibiting judges from merging certain offenses for sentencing, and
empowering prosecutors to trigger longer sentences through selection of charges); id. § 2C:35-
12 (stipulating that a mandatory minimum sentence applies unless the prosecutor agrees to
a lesser sentence, and that the court may not impose a lesser sentence than parties specified
in plea agreement). But see id. (granting, in a 2010 amendment, judicial power to waive
minimum period of parole ineligibility); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.084, 775.0843 (West
2015) (defining habitual offender criteria for more severe, mandatory punishments and giving
prosecutors discretion to charge under such provisions). For an early example of a statute
increasing prosecutor authority, see People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993, 996 (Cal. 1970) (citing
state statute that granted unreviewable discretion to the prosecutor). Federal prosecutors are
forthright about charging offenses that carry mandatory minimums if they anticipate they
will not agree with a judges use of her sentencing discretion. U.S. SENTENCING COMMN, supra
note 16, at 86 n.464 (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/ pdf/news/congressional-
testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V3LJ-G46R] ([A] prosecutor is far less willing to forego charging a
mandatory minimum sentence when prior experience shows that the defendant will
ultimately be sentenced to a mere fraction of what the guidelines range is. (alteration in
original) (quoting testimony of Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney, Northern District of
Illinois)). See generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 130-42 (1998) (discussing prosecutorial discretion and
noting that prosecutors exercise discretion under the sentencing guidelines when they decide
what to charge, enter plea agreement, and suggest downward departures); Ronald F. Wright,
Charging and Plea Bargaining as Forms of Sentencing Discretion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 247, 247-69 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012)
(discussing the authority that prosecutors have over sentencing in jurisdictions that have
sentencing guidelines).
114. R ex rel. B v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions [DPP] [2009] EWHC (Admin) 106 [52], [2009]
1 Crim. App. 38.
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before ... a jury.115 Nevertheless, defendants in English courts can
challenge charging decisions as unlawful, including decisions to
charge greater rather than lesser offenses,116 and courts permit
victims to challenge prosecutors declination decisions, or their
decisions to dismiss filed charges.117
In fact:
[R]eview is less rare in the case of a decision not to prosecute
than a decision to prosecute (because a decision not to prosecute
is final, subject to judicial review, whereas a decision to prose-
cute leaves the defendant free to challenge the prosecutions case
in the usual way through the criminal court).118
The same standards apply to decisions to nolle pros charges, even
though English law continues to adhere to the common law rule
that prosecutors control the power of nolle prosequi.119 Courts justify
this form of review on the premise that a decision not to prosecute,
especially in circumstances where it is believed or asserted that the
decision is or may be erroneous, can affect public confidence in the
integrity and competence of the criminal justice system.120 For this
reason, decisions not to charge in incidents that involve deaths in
state custody get closer scrutiny to guard against prosecutors
favoritism toward other law enforcement officials.121 Again, review
is deferential and the actual number of judicial reversals of such
decisions appears to be small. But unlike state courts authority not
to grant nolle pros requests or federal court scrutiny of biased charg-
ing under the Armstrong standard,122 this authority is meaningful:
115. R v. DPP ex parte Manning [2000] EWHC (QB) 562 [23], [2001] QB 330.
116. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
117. See Victims Right to Review Scheme, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. [CPS], http://www.
cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_right_to_review/ [https://perma.cc/X4YE-L2S4] (last up-
dated July 2014).
118. R ex rel. B v. DPP [2009] EWHC (Admin) 106 [52].
119. For an example of a court finding wrongful a decision to discontinue prosecution, see
id. at [63]. On prosecutors nolle pros authority, see R v. FB [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1857 [13],
[2010] 2 Crim. App. 35, and R ex rel. Gujra v. CPS [2012] UKSC 52 [10]-[25], [2013] 1 AC 484.
See also R v. DPP ex parte C [1995] 1 Crim. App. 136.
120. R ex rel. Da Silva v. DPP [2006] EWHC (Admin) 3204 [20].
121. See R v. DPP ex parte Manning [2000] EWHC (QB) 562 [33]; R v. Metro. Police Commr
ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 All ER 319; ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 111, at 221-22.
122. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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English courts periodically disapprove of prosecutors decisions not
to file criminal charges.
Challenges to prosecutorial discretion can be raised on several
bases. English judges will intervene in a decision not to prosecute
only when a complainant can demonstrate the decision was (1) be-
cause of some unlawful policy, (2) because of a failure to act in
accordance with settled policy as set out in the Code [for Crown Pro-
secutors], or (3) because the decision was perverse, i.e. one at which
no reasonable prosecutor could have arrived.123 Similar standards
apply to the review of decisions to file charges.124 The reasonable-
ness standard is not far removed from the kind of review American
courts engage in under constitutional standards or with regard to
administrative agency decisions, although here it does not extend to
the context of criminal law administration.125 The bigger difference
123. R ex rel. Da Silva v. DPP [2006] EWHC (Admin) 3204 [24]; see, e.g., Marshall v. DPP
[2007] UKPC 4 (Jam.) (leading decision on unlawful policy grounds); R ex rel. Da Silva v. DPP
[2006] EWHC (Admin) 3204 (same); Sharma v. DPP [2006] UKPC 57, [2007] 1 WLR 780 (Trin.
& Tobago) (same); R v. DPP ex parte Manning [2000] EWHC (QB) 562, [2001] QB 330 (same);
R v. DPP ex parte Kebeline [1999] UKHL 43, [2000] 2 AC 326 (UK) (same); R v. Metro. Police
Commr ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 All ER 319 (same); see also, e.g., Guest v. DPP [2009]
EWHC (Admin) 594, [2009] 2 Crim. App. 26 (leading decision on reasonableness/perversity
grounds); R v. Gen. Council of the Bar ex parte Percival [1990] 3 All ER 137 (same); see also
ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 111, at 221-22; Christopher Hilson, Discretion to
Prosecute and Judicial Review, 1993 CRIM. L. REV. 739, 739 (Eng.) (providing an overview of
prosecutorial discretion); Appeals: Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Decisions, CPS, http://
www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/appeals_judicial_review_of_prosecution_decisions/
[https://perma.cc/W89L-DJY8] (last updated May 21, 2009).
English courts have acknowledged that the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) may impose obligations to prosecute in certain circumstances, or more generally to
require a state to maintain a criminal justice system that provides sufficient protection to
citizens. So far, English standards of review of noncharging decisions, based in domestic law,
have been held sufficient to meet any such obligation. See R ex parte B v. DPP [2009] EWHC
(Admin) 106 [67]-[70], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 38 (discussing state obligations under Articles 2
and 3 of the Convention). English courts cannot stay a prosecution simply because the under-
lying statute is held to be in conflict with the ECHR. But see R v. DPP ex rel. Kebeline [1999]
UKHL 43 [17], [2000] 2 AC 326 (UK) (noting that in exceptional cases, defense arguments
that a charged offense is incompatible withor that evidence gathering violatedthe ECHR
may be raised as abuse of process on the basis that it is unfair for the prosecution to proceed).
124. See, e.g., R v. Inland Revenue Commrs ex parte Mead [1993] 1 All ER 772 at 775-77.
For the general standard of unreasonableness that justifies a judicial decision to quash a
public agencys decision, see Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp.
[1947] EWCA (Civ) 1, [1948] KB 223 (Eng.); see also ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 111,
at 221.
125. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 837 (1985) (although federal law
guarantees that a person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action or failure to act
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lies in the legal status of prosecutors charging policies. The U.S.
Attorneys Manual and other federal Justice Department guidelines
closely resemble in their form, substance, and formality the English
Code for Crown Prosecutors.126 The critical distinction is that the
latter is truly an administrative code. It exists by statutory man-
date, has status equivalent to federal administrative regulations,
and therefore serves as the basis for judicial review to ensure that
the agency abides by its own guidelines.127 Changes to the Code for
Crown Prosecutors must go through a formal process that includes
public consultationa notice and comment period in U.S.
parlance.128 That is not true of U.S. Justice Department policies129
or state prosecution guidelines.130 Federal policies exist at the
discretion of the Attorney General, and courts treat them as unen-
forceable provisions.131
is entitled to judicial review, presumption against review of agency nonenforcement actions
was not overcome); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
41-43, 52 (1983) (requiring the administrative agency to provide rational reasons for rescind-
ing motor vehicle safety requirements).
126. Compare, e.g., DEPT OF JUSTICE [DOJ], U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL (1997), http://www.
justice.gov/usam/united-states-attorneys-manual [https://perma.cc/A9XU-29AW] [hereinafter
U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL], with CPS, THE CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS (2013),
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/code_2013_accessible_english.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3RVA-EY2X] [hereinafter CPS CODE], and CPS Instructions for Prosecuting Advocates,
CPS, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/prosecuting_advocates_instructions/ [https://perma.
cc/B4VH-XS8D] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
127. Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, c. 23, § 10 (Eng.). For a brief summary of the rele-
vant provision, see R ex rel. Gujra v. CPS [2012] UKSC 52 [96]-[101] (Lord Mance) (appeal
taken from EWHC Admin) (UK).
128. The English government runs a consultation website where citizens are given the
opportunity to voice their opinions about the Crowns prosecution policy. See Consultations,
CPS, http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/index.html [https://perma.cc/R2EF-JGGJ].
129. See U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL, supra note 126, § 1-1.600.
130. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901 (West 2015) (providing legislative guidance on
local prosecutors domestic violence charging policy); WIS.STAT. § 968.075(7) (2015) (providing
legislative guidance on local prosecutors domestic violence charging policy); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 775.08401 (repealed 2011) (defining local prosecutors authority on sentencing policies). For
an example of a rare state exception in New Jersey, see supra notes 97-98.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 1978) (We also
consider ill-founded the notion that a departmental policy such as the present one is capable
of giving rise to an enforceable right in favor of the defendant. The decisions hold that a press
release expressing a policy statement and not promulgated as a regulation of the Department
of Justice and published in the Federal Register is simply a housekeeping provision of the
Department. (quoting Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 184 (1954))).
2016] JUDICIAL POWER TO REGULATE PLEA BARGAINING 1261
Additionally, English courts may prohibit prosecutions on various
grounds that constitute abuse of process by police or prosecu-
tors.132 One strand of abuse of process doctrine resembles American
law: courts will bar prosecution after prosecutors tell a defendant
that a specific charge would not be pursued if the defendant can
show reliance on the initial nonprosecution pronouncement.133 But
English doctrine seems to be broader than American. A stay can be
justified for police misconduct as well, including police promises not
to prosecute, even though prosecutors control decisions to charge.134
Courts may stay prosecutions for abuse of process even when a fair
trial is possible because they are acting within their inherent power
to regulate and prevent abuse of the judicial process. A leading deci-
sion describes the rationale in rule of law terms:
[T]he judiciary accept a responsibility for the maintenance of the
rule of law that embraces a willingness to oversee executive
action and to refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens
either basic human rights or the rule of law .... The courts, of
course, have no power to apply direct discipline to the police or
the prosecuting authorities, but they can refuse to allow them to
take advantage of abuse of power by regarding their behaviour
as an abuse of process and thus preventing a prosecution.135
132. See Abuse of Process, CPS, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/ abuse_of_process/
[https://perma.cc/JZV7-LNYM] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
133. See Nembhard v. DPP [2009] EWHC (Admin) 194 [16]-[17] (describing the courts
authority to stay prosecutions for abuse of process); see also R ex rel. Smith v. CPS [2010]
EWHC (Admin) 3593 [1], [44] (staying domestic violence prosecution from continuing under
abuse of process standard after the CPS agreed to not prosecute); R v. Bloomfield [1996]
EWCA (Crim) 1801 [8]-[9], [38], [1997] 1 Crim. App. 135 (quashing a drug conviction based
on abuse or process standard). See generally ANDREW L-T CHOO, ABUSE OF PROCESS AND
JUDICIAL STAYS OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2d ed. 2008) (analyzing courts ability to stay
criminal proceedings that are deemed to be an abuse of court process).
134. See Abuse of Process, supra note 132; see also Jonathan Rogers, The Boundaries of
Abuse of Process in Criminal Trials, 61 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 289, 292-93 (2008) (describing
the expansion in recent decades of English abuse of process doctrine). In extreme cases, U.S.
courts also dismiss prosecutions for police misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Broward, 459
F. Supp. 321, 326-28 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that government agents deliberate misrepre-
sentation of facts in affidavit relating to an informants identity and related false statements
to district judge required dismissal of drug prosecution for governmental misconduct).
135. R v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct. ex parte Bennett [1993] UKHL 10 at 13-14, [1994] AC
42 (UK).
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The remedy in such cases is to order a stay of prosecutionor, after
trial, to reverse a convictionrather than to dismiss with preju-
dice,136 but this power also appears to be sparingly used.137
Overall, then, English courts supervision of prosecutorial dis-
cretion is deferential and concentrates on extremes of unfair or in-
consistent enforcement actions, but review is nonetheless real and
meaningful. No comparable law or judicial track record exists in
U.S. state or federal courts,138 in which the standard view is that
[s]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file ... generally
136. See R v. Adaway [2004] EWCA (Crim) 2831 [26] (reversing a trial judges denial of a
stay and quashing defendants conviction).
137. But cf. Rogers, supra note 134, at 289 (observing that abuse of process case law has
multiplied despite reminders it is only to be exercised in the rarest of cases). The law is clear
that English judges, like their American counterparts, cannot stay or quash a valid indict-
ment on grounds that public resources are limited or that other cases in a crowded docket
should take priority. See R v. FB [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1857 [34], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 35
(holding that the trial judge had no power to quash a valid indictment on grounds that re-
sources were limited). For a similar American decision, see People v. Stewart, 217 N.W.2d
894, 896 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974), and Czajka v. Koweek, 953 N.Y.S.2d 394, 397 (App. Div. 2012)
(citing In re Soares v. Herrick, 928 N.Y.S.2d 386, 390 (App. Div. 2011) (holding that the
district attorney has wide discretion over public resources to discharge duties)).
138. See, e.g., McArthur v. State, 597 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that
the victim has no authority over decisions to prosecutethat power rests with the states
attorney); Scanlon v. State Bar of Ga., 443 S.E.2d 830 (Ga. 1994) (holding that private citizens
have no judicially cognizable interests in prosecutions or decisions not to prosecute); State v.
Winne, 96 A.2d 63, 70 (N.J. 1953) (holding that prosecutors have the exclusive authority to
handle the criminal business of the state). For a more subtle example of U.S. disfavor of
restrictions on prosecutorial authority based on prior notice to defendants, consider judicial
interpretation of the following federal statute:
Hearing before report of criminal violation. Before any violation of this chapter
is reported by the Secretary to any United States attorney for institution of a
criminal proceeding, the person against whom such proceeding is contemplated
shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity to present his views, either
orally or in writing, with regard to such contemplated proceeding.
21 U.S.C. § 335 (2012). The Supreme Court has concluded that this obligation is not a
prerequisite to prosecution. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278-79 (1943).
A few states have rarely used provisions giving courts or private parties some ability to
check public prosecutors. Two states require prosecutors to file reasons for a nonprosecution
decision with the court in certain serious cases. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.41 (2015)
(requiring, in certain cases, that prosecutors file reasons with court for not charging; upon
review, courts can order the prosecutor to file charge); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1606 (2015)
(same). Additionally, Pennsylvania requires prosecutors to give reasons for nonprosecution,
which courts may review only after receiving a private complaint. PA. R. CRIM. P. 506.
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rests entirely in his discretion.139 American judges retain the power
to dismiss prosecutions for outrageous government conduct, but only
as an extraordinary remedy.140 They believe more strongly than
their English counterparts that the decision to prosecute is partic-
ularly ill-suited to judicial review141 and stress more insistently the
limits of judicial capacity.142
Consider two additional barriers to review of decisions not to pro-
secute. Unlike English courts,143 U.S. state and federal courts deny
standing to victims, their families, or other aggrieved parties, which
strengthens the executive branchs monopoly of prosecution auth-
ority.144 Even if they entertained such claims, as federal courts do in
139. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 364 (1978)); see also United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Prosecutorial discretion resides in the executive, not in the judicial, branch, and that discre-
tion, though subject of course to judicial review to protect constitutional rights, is not review-
able for a simple abuse of discretion.). See generally 27 C.J.S. District and Prosecuting
Attorneys § 28 (2016) (collecting and summarizing cases that affirm wide prosecutorial
discretion subject to judicial review generally only under deferential constitutional rules).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 904
(9th Cir. 1993) (The governments conduct may warrant a dismissal of the indictment if that
conduct is so excessive, f lagrant, scandalous, intolerable and offensive as to violate due
process.); United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 1991) (For a due process dis-
missal, the Governments conduct must be so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate
the universal sense of justice.); State v. Perleberg, 736 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. Ct. App.
2007).
141. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-65
(1996); Giannattasio, 979 F.2d at 100.
142. See Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (rejecting a petition for a
writ of mandamus to compel a prosecutor to charge police officers with illegal wiretapping on
the grounds that: [F]ederal courts are powerless to interfere with [the prosecutors] discre-
tionary power. The Court cannot compel him to prosecute a complaint, or even an indictment,
whatever his reasons for not acting.); People v. Birks, 960 P.2d 1073, 1089 (Cal. 1998)
([P]rosecuting authorities ... ordinarily have the sole discretion to determine whom to charge
.... The prosecutions authority ... generally is not subject to supervision by the judicial
branch.); In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 873 (Wyo. 1984) (We think it is clear that ... the
charging decision is properly within the scope of duty of the executive branch.); cf. United
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1992) (holding that the federal courts supervisory
powers over grand juries does not include the power to make a rule allowing dismissal of an
otherwise valid indictment when the prosecutor has failed to introduce substantial excul-
patory evidence to a grand jury).
143. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
144. See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (holding that a crime victim
lacks standing in federal court to seek an injunction against a state prosecutors unconsti-
tutionally discriminatory enforcement policy for the crime of failure to pay child support,
because a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-
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many civil enforcement contexts, judges would need access to
prosecutors stated reasons for opting not to charge. U.S. judges are
loathe to require explanations from prosecutors,145 while English
courts commonly examine reasons conveyed either to the court or to
victims, and they may even require prosecutors to disclose internal
documents.146 The rare and marginal exceptions to the American
hands-off approach prove the rule. Two states authorize courts to
demand reasons from prosecutors for not charging based on a
private complaint.147 Four states give their courts limited author-
ityrarely usedto assign special prosecutors when a public prose-
cutor neglects to pursue well-grounded charges.148 At the same
time, such statutes confirm the constitutionality of granting courts
prosecution of another); In re Hickson, 765 A.2d 372, 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (noting that
a private complainant lacks standing to challenge district attorneys decision not to prose-
cute).
145. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
146. See R ex rel. Da Silva v. DPP [2006] EWHC (Admin) 3204 [60] (noting use of redacted
investigative report and case notes from CPS, but disavowing evaluation of evidence). English
judges do not, however, examine underlying evidence against a suspect. Id. Under the ECHR,
prosecutors in limited circumstances may have a duty to give reasons for nonprosecution. See
Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 82-86, 122-23, 142-45 (2001)
(holding that under ECHR art. 2, prosecutors should give reasons to the victims family
explaining the decision not to bring criminal charges after investigating a death caused by a
police shooting); see also R v. DPP ex parte Manning [2000] EWHC (QB) 562 [33], [2001] QB
330 (Lord Bingham CJ) (In the absence of compelling grounds for not giving reasons, we
would expect the Director to give reasons in such a case [of nonprosecution]: to meet the
reasonable expectation of interested parties that either a prosecution would follow or a
reasonable explanation for not prosecuting be given.).
147. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-209 (West 2015) (permitting judge to require prose-
cutor to explain nonprosecution); PA. R. CRIM. P. 506 (requiring prosecutors reasons upon
private complaint objecting to nonprosecution).
148. See ALA. CODE § 12-17-186 (2015) (presiding judge may appoint an attorney to act as
public prosecutor in cases of conflict of interest or when the district attorney refuses to act;
no appellate decisions document that this power has ever been used); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-5-209 (West 2015) (stipulating that upon affidavit alleging unjustified refusal to charge,
a judge may require public prosecutor to explain reasons; if arbitrary or capricious, a judge
may order prosecution or appoint a special prosecutor); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.12 (West
2015) (same, but whenever public prosecutor is present, the statute requires the prosecutors
consent for any payment to the court-appointed prosecutor); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 11-16-06
(West 2015) (authorizing courts to appoint special prosecutor if the states attorney has
refused or neglected to perform any duties). Additionally, Pennsylvania allows courts to au-
thorize private prosecutors to take over cases from public prosecutors. 16 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1409 (West 2015). Texas alone retains a unique Court of Inquiry procedure,
also rarely deployed, that empowers judges to investigate suspected crimes and issue arrest
warrants. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 52.01-52.08 (West 2015).
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capacities of this sort. Legislatures could enact judicially enforce-
able parameters for prosecutorial decision making, but following
courts leads, they have opted to leave executive discretion almost
whollyand perhaps uniquelyunregulated. That policy is evident
in other areas of law as well. U.S. prosecutors enjoy absolute
immunity from civil liability for their unconstitutional conduct when
acting in their prosecutorial function,149 regardless of the egregious-
ness of the violation or the severity of the injuries it caused. Save for
judges, other government officials enjoy only partial or qualified
immunity.150 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized its con-
fidence in prosecutors professional integrity and trustworthiness as
the reason it grants a strong presumption of lawfulness to their
149. See Jeffries, Jr., supra note 75, at 221-30. Compare Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
432 (1976) ([I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the States case, the prosecutor is
immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.), with Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
521 (1985) (denying absolute immunity to a prosecutor who authorized a warrantless wiretap
on grounds he was not acting in his prosecutorial capacity).
150. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809 (1982) (holding that executive offi-
cials generally enjoy only qualified immunity).
The prospects of prosecutors facing criminal sanctions, even for flagrant misconduct, are
vanishingly small. In 1996, three Chicago prosecutors (and four sheriff s deputies) were in-
dicted for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury that contributed to wrongful murder
convictions. Charges against two of the prosecutors were dismissed before trial; the other was
acquitted in 1999, as were the deputies. Although the local government paid a $3.5 million
dollar settlement to the wrongfully convicted men, all prosecutors continued to practice law:
one as a chief judge of a state circuit court, one as a federal prosecutor, and one as a defense
attorney. See Andrew Bluth, Prosecutor and 4 Sheriff s Deputies Are Acquitted of Wrongfully
Accusing a Man of Murder, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/ 1999/06/05/
us/prosecutor-4-sheriff-s-deputies-are-acquitted-wrongfully-accusing-man-murder.html
[https://perma.cc/57QJ-8BFD]; Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, Police Perjury and Jailhouse
Snitch Testimony Put Rolando Cruz on Death Row, NW. U. SCH. L., http://www.law.north
western.edu/legalcl inic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/i l/rolando-cruz.html
[https://perma.cc/YP28-QQRD] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). For comparison, the GermanPenal
Code defines felony-level punishments for prosecutors who file baseless charges, or who fail
to pursue well-grounded ones. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 339, translation
at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html [https://perma.cc/W6
2M-TKHJ] (making perversion of justice by a judge or another public official punishable by
imprisonment from one to five years); id. §§ 258, 258a (subjecting anyone who obstructs the
punishment of another by an unlawful act to punishment of up to five years in prison or a
fine); see also Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law Between Public and Private Law, in THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 191, 204-05 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010) (discussing the
German Criminal Code and the punishment available for instances of official misconduct in
criminal cases); Kessler, supra note 107, at 216 (stating that in Germany, police officers are
not authorized to drop cases).
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actions.151 Why U.S. judges and legislators trust prosecutors more
and regulate them less is a question for another day, but surely part
of the explanation is that U.S. jurisdictions rely on the political pro-
cess rather than the law to check prosecutorial abuse; the U.S. is
alone in electing its prosecutors.152
To be clear, this body of English law governing charging discre-
tion is not expressly directed at prosecutors tactical use of charging
options in the plea bargaining process. Charge bargaining is
expressly permitted by the Code for Crown Prosecutors, within
vaguely worded limits that courts apparently have no opportunity
to enforce.153 The point here is not that English law successfully re-
stricts coercive or otherwise undesirable prosecutorial tactics in plea
bargaining, nor that England significantly restricts plea bargaining.
151. The presumption of regularity, which the Court sometimes notes is assured by legal
education, bars oversight and internal supervision within prosecutors offices. See Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 263-65 (2006); United States
v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Town
of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395-97 (1987); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-
08 (1985). On the sufficiency of informal regulation, see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-
43, 343 n.5 (1986); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428-30. See generally Jennifer E. Laurin, Prosecutorial
Exceptionalism, Remedial Skepticism, and the Legacy of Connick v. Thompson, in 27 CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 29, 51-58 (Steven Saltzman ed.,
2011) (discussing Connick and the unchecked power of prosecutors).
152. See In re Hickson, 765 A.2d 372, 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (The prosecutor is elected
to run her office using her broad discretion fairly and honestly.If she fails to do so, the remedy
lies .... in the power of the electorate to vote her out of office.); In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870,
873-74 (Wyo. 1984) (disapproving judicial supervision of prosecutor decisions and noting that
district and county attorneys hold elective offices; if their constituents are unsatisfied, they
are free to express their feelings at the voting polls); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.,
542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004) (The decision to prosecute a criminal case, for example, is made by
a publicly accountable prosecutor subject to budgetary considerations.). For a development
of this argument, see BROWN, supra note 11, at 25-28. See also Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp.
630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (The remedy for any dereliction of his duty lies, not with the courts,
but, with the executive branch of our government and ultimately with the people.); Milliken
v. Stone, 7 F.2d 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), aff d, 16 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1927) (holding that
courts are without power to compel prosecutors to enforce the penal laws .... The remedy
... is with the executive and ultimately with the people); United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262,
262-63 (D. Mont. 1924); Czajka v. Koweek, 953 N.Y.S.2d 394, 397 (App. Div. 2012) (stating
that the district attorney is a constitutional officer, chosen by the electors of his or her county
to prosecute all crimes and offenses, with wide discretion over public resources to discharge
duties as he judges most effective (quoting In re Soares v. Herrick, 928 N.Y.S.2d 386, 390
(App. Div. 2011))).
153. CPS CODE, supra note 126, § 9.2 (prosecutors may not enter charge bargains merely
for convenience nor agree to charge reductions that would prevent the court from imposing
a sentence that matches the seriousness of the offen[se]).
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English law embraces plea bargaining. Judicial sentencing guide-
lines authorize discounts for guilty pleas up to one-third less than
a post-trial sentence.154 And England has plenty of plea bargaining.
In the Crown Courts of England and Wales, which handle what U.S.
law would label serious felonies, 73.5 percent of charged defendants
pled guilty in 2009-2010, and 91 percent of convictions occurred
through guilty pleas.155 In the federal courts the same year, 87.7
percent of charged defendants pled guilty and 96.7 percent of convic-
tions came through guilty pleas.156 Thus, whatever limits English
154. Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, Explanatory Notes ¶¶ 447, 489 (UK); SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COUNCIL, REDUCTION IN SENTENCE FOR A GUILTY PLEA §§ 2.1, 2.2, 4.2 (2007),
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Reduction_in_Sentence_for_a_
Guilty_Plea_-Revised_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDP9-LCKR]; Attorney Gens. Reference Nos.
14 & 15 (Tanya French & Alan Webster) [2006] EWCA (Crim) 1335 [52], [2007] 1 All ER 718
(noting that the [g]uidelines do no more than provide guidance [to judges]. There may well
be circumstances which justify awarding less than a discount of one third where a plea of
guilty has been made at the first opportunity).
155. CPS, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2011-12, at 85 tbl.7 (2012), http://www.cps.
gov.uk/publications/docs/cps_annual_report_and_accounts_2012.pdf. [https://perma.cc/GL6G-
AKCL] (data for years 2009 through 2012). Of the 26.5 percent of charged defendants who did
not plead guilty, 12.9 percent went to trial (where 7.2 percent were convicted), and the
remainder earned dismissal or judge acquittal. Id.
156. For 2009 federal data, see MARKMOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,DOJ,NCJ
233464, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2009STATISTICAL TABLES 18 tbl.4.2 (rev. 2012), http://
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09st.pdf [https://perma.cc/59K9-NK7B]. In U.S. federal courts in the
years 2007-2011, guilty plea rates increased from 95.8 to 96.9 percent of all convictions; the
percentage of convictions following trial declined from 4.2 to 3.1 percent. U.S. SENTENCING
COMMN, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.C, http://www.ussc.
gov/research-and-publications/annual-reports-sourcebooks/2011/sourcebook-2011
[https://perma.cc/V8K2-AA86]. Guilty plea rates within each of the twelve federal circuits
showed little variation, ranging from 93.6 to 98.3 percent in 2011. Id. at tbl.10, https://
perma.cc/4DD2-PQRK.
Data is less thorough for state courts, but figures appear to be similar. See, e.g., VA. CRIM-
INAL SENTENCINGCOMMN,2014ANNUALREPORT 33 (2014), http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/2014
AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXF3-GSKL] (90 percent of felony sentences in circuit
courts followed guilty pleas, 9 percent bench trials, 1.2 percent jury trials). In 2001, data from
twenty-two states found 3 percent of state criminal cases were resolved by either bench or
jury trial, the remainder by guilty pleas, dismissals or other disposition. See NATL CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATECOURTS, 2001:A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM
THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 63 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/Digitization/195881NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUP4-E564]. Hawaii had the high-
est trial rate at 12.8 percent; Vermonts rate of 0.9 percent was lowest. Id.; see also HON.
GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., NATL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY
OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 63 (2007), http://www.ncsc-jury
studies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx[https://perma.cc/
J52U-ZNNW] (reporting similar, more recent data, although in different terms, for example,
trials per 100,000 population).
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law places on prosecutorial discretion are compatible with high
rates of guilty pleas. The point here is simply that English law, built
on traditions of common law and adversarial process shared across
U.S. jurisdictions, demonstrates the feasibility of regulating some
aspects of prosecutorial discretion, including a modest role for ju-
dicial oversight akin to U.S. judicial review in the context of
administrative agencies. Some regulation of that sort is essential to
meaningful regulation of plea bargaining, especially given contem-
porary conditions of expansive criminal codeswhich multiply
charging optionsand mandatory sentencing rules, which turn
charging decisions into sentencing decisions.157 In fact, as the next
Part recounts, in the early years of modern plea bargain regulation,
U.S. courts developed broadly comparable constitutional doctrines
to ensure fairness in negotiated guilty pleas. But the U.S. Supreme
Court eventually chose a different path for federal law, which states
have largely followed.
IV. THE PRESUMPTION OF FAIRNESS IN UNREGULATED BARGAINING
Limits on guilty plea sentence discounts and on prosecutorial
charging discretion are important waysprobably critical waysby
which plea bargaining can be regulated. But they are not the only
ways to regulate bargaining. After the U.S. Supreme Court finally
acknowledged plea bargaining in 1971 and initiated constitutional
regulation of its practice,158 federal courts began to develop a body
157. English law and practice differs in important respects on this point. English prose-
cutors do not make sentence recommendations or otherwise argue for specific sentences on
the premise that sentencing is a judicial function. See R v. Atkinson [1978] 1 WLR 425 at 428
(In our law the prosecution is not heard upon sentence. This is a matter for the court, after
considering whatever has to be said on behalf of an accused man.); Sir John May, The
Responsibility of the Prosecutor to the Court, in THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR 90, 94 (J.E.
Hall Williams ed., 1988) (author was a Lord Justice of Appeal). Since the 1980s, English pro-
secutors have assisted courts by drawing attention to governing sentencing law and relevant
facts but still avoid American-style sentencing recommendations. ANDREW ASHWORTH,
SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 377-78 (5th ed. 2010). Moreover, English law has signif-
icantly fewer mandatory sentencing rules, which makes charging decisions less determinative
of punishments. But see Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, c.6, §§ 110-111 (UK)
(establishing mandatory sentencing for the third offense of domestic burglary or Class A drug
trafficking); Firearms Act 1968, c.27, § 51(1) (UK) (establishing sentencing guidelines for
firearms offenses).
158. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-63 (1971).
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of law that focused on the fairness of the bargaining process and of
plea bargain terms.159 The Court in Santobello v. New York conclud-
ed that plea bargaining was essential to criminal justice adminis-
tration but also that the Constitution put limits on how it is
practiced.160 The principles that justify plea bargaining, the Court
wrote, presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an ac-
cused and a prosecutor.161 Plea agreements must be attended by
safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the
circumstances.162 The Court warned that federal courts will vacate
a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained.163 The Con-
stitution, Santobello strongly implied, requires judges to supervise
plea bargaining.164
Many lower courts took that Santobello language seriously and in
the 1970s began to develop more specific fairness standards for plea
negotiations grounded in Due Process doctrine. For a time, courts
used those doctrines to exercise modest but meaningful judicial
supervision over plea bargaining. With the jury now absent from
adjudication, courts aimed both to protect the plea bargaining
defendant from overreaching by the prosecutor and to insure the
integrity of the plea bargaining process.165 Judges kept a close eye
on whether prosecutors had met the most meticulous standards of
both promise and performance ... in plea bargaining.166
In order to facilitate meaningful judicial scrutiny, prosecutors had
to create records that enabled judicial review of some aspects of
their discretionary actions. In United States v. Bowler, the plea
agreement included the promise that prosecutors would make their
sentencing recommendation only after considering certain mitigat-
ing factors, such as a defendants cooperation and his health.167 That
159. See infra notes 165-66.
160. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260-63.
161. Id. at 261.
162. Id. at 262.
163. Id. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,
224 (1927)).
164. See id. at 262.
165. United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 854 (7th Cir. 1978).
166. Id. (quoting Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973)); see also
Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 1976) ([F]unda-
mental fairness and public confidence in government officials require that prosecutors be held
to meticulous standards of both promise and performance.).
167. Bowler, 585 F.2d at 854-55.
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discretionary assessment is an evaluative function normally per-
formed internally within the office of the prosecutor, but the
Seventh Circuit insisted on some disclosure about how prosecutors
exercised their discretion: [T]he Governments evaluation of the
specified mitigating factors must be set forth in the record at the
time of sentencing.168 Numerous courts also called out prosecutors
for half-heartedly fulfilling promises, particularly sentence recom-
mendations, and required that they offer supporting arguments to
trial courts for the recommendations to which they had agreed.169
Another application of post-Santobello Due Process doctrine target-
ed the heart of prosecutorial charge manipulation in the bargaining
process.
Before Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
required that prosecutors provide reasons to justify additional
charges they filed against a defendant after he had rejected their
plea bargain offer.170 These requirements were not so different from
requirements in English law under which prosecutors disclose to
courts reasons for their discretionary decisions.171 In many cases,
making rationales for prosecutors actions transparent was the only
way for courts to ascertain whether or not the Government had in
fact performed the promised evaluation.172 The alternative was sep-
aration of powers without the ability of one branch to check and
balance the actions of another. More specifically, the alternative was
to leave the judiciary incapable of determining the lawfulness of
executive action in the adjudication process: [I]t is not the privilege
of the Government to make the determination as to whether or not
it has honored its promise.173
168. Id.
169. See Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862, 870-71 (5th Cir. 1975) (ordering prose-
cutors to make strong recommendations to the Parole Board as well as to the Department of
State against a defendants extradition to fulfill promises made in a plea bargain); United
States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that where the prosecutor
promised to recommend a particular sentence, the mere half-hearted recitation of the recom-
mended sentence without reasons for supporting it breached the plea agreement); Correale
v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973) ([M]ost meticulous standards of both
promise and performance must be met by prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining.).
170. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44-45 (6th Cir. 1976).
171. See, e.g., R ex rel. Da Silva v. DPP [2006] EWHC (Admin) 3204 [27] (discussing the
rationale underlying the Crown Prosecution Services decision not to prosecute).
172. Bowler, 585 F.2d at 854-55.
173. Id. at 855.
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Private contract law became an increasingly common reference
point for the public law of plea negotiations, but after Santobello,
lower courts concluded that Santobellos constitutional mandate
that guilty pleas be fairly obtained required judges to scrutinize
negotiated agreements between the government and defendants by
more rigorous standards than the law of contract did for private
parties in ordinary market transactions. For example, the Fourth
Circuit held that while ordinarily private contract offers are not
enforceable, the Due Process Clause mandated that prosecutors
plea bargain offers were enforceable.174 In other words, prosecutors
could not withdraw offers before a defendant had a chance to accept.
On this point as well, federal constitutional law was, for a time, on
a path not far removed from English law, which enforces some
prosecution promises to victims to chargeor to defendants not to
chargein particular cases.175
This body of Due Process doctrine suggests that the differences in
the capacity of English and American judiciaries to oversee prose-
cutors do not arise from fundamental differences in constitutional
or institutional structure. The problem is not that federal and state
constitutions impose incontrovertible limits on judicial authority
and insulate prosecutors more than English law does in the English
justice system. This approach to Due Process law did not last
because constitutional text and tradition dictated no specific
answers in this realm; it left courts plausible options for what the
law should be. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected it in favor of a
different vision for federal constitutional law, one that draws
heavily on contract law to limit judicial capacity and protect execu-
tive authority. It adopted a conception of how our system operates
that differed both from the approach of many lower federal courts
after Santobello and from English analogs, even though alternatives
in which the judiciary played a greater regulatory role in plea
174. Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 15-19 (4th Cir. 1979). In Cooper, the prosecutor
offered to dismiss three of four charges in exchange for defendants guilty plea and cooperation
in other cases. Id. at 15. The defense counsel quickly met with his client and called to accept
the offer four hours after it was extended, but during that time, a supervising prosecutor had
vetoed the offer and so the office refused to abide by it. Id. The court held that the offer was
enforceable. Id. at 19. Private contract law generally would not enforce an offer before accep-
tance, absent defendants detrimental reliance on the agreement. Id. at 15-17.
175. See, e.g., CHOO, supra note 133, at 64-68.
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bargaining were fully available in the sense that they were plaus-
ible routes for constitutional law development.176
The Supreme Court built the contemporary constitutional law of
plea bargaining upon a set of premises that excluded judges from a
meaningful role in plea bargaining process or in assuring substan-
tively fair outcomes from that process. This constitutional vision in
turn has largely set the parameters for all state and federal law on
plea bargaining. From its assumption that plea bargaining is an
essential component of the administration of justice,177 the Court
took the view that rules related to guilty pleas must maximize the
efficiency of the bargaining process. To serve that aim, the Court
looked to the private law of contract, and to the free-market premis-
es that party autonomy and minimal state regulation maximize
efficiency. In the Courts view, plea bargains are essentially con-
tracts,178 much like any other bargained-for exchange.179 In
contrast to their English counterparts, the Justices cite private
contract law treatises in plea bargaining decisions and draw on
private contract principles for remedies to plea bargain breaches.180
The market-based rationality is at times almost comically explicit:
176. See supra notes 165-75 and accompanying text (arguing that inferior federal courts
interpreted the Constitution to require some judicial oversight of plea bargaining).
177. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399, 1407 (2012) ([P]lea bargains have become ... central to the administration of the crimin-
al justice system.); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 372 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(The plea-bargaining process ... is essential to the functioning of the criminal-justice
system.); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 222 & n.12 (1978) (noting that the process of
plea bargaining is mutually beneficial to the defendant and the state). But see Alschuler,
supra note 8, at 952, 955 (noting and rebutting claims of plea bargainings practical necessity).
178. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009).
179. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984).
180. United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677-78 (1997) ([I]f the court rejects the Govern-
ments promised performance, then the agreement is terminated and the defendant has the
right to back out of his promised performance (the guilty plea), just as a binding contractual
duty may be extinguished by the nonoccurrence of a condition subsequent.). Courts similarly
base remedies for breaches of plea agreements on those developed in private contract law. See
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411; Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388-89 (2012). For an example of
a court addressing disputes about whether either party breached a plea agreement, see
United States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1338 (7th Cir. 1988). See generally Nancy J. King,
Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 293 (2005) (advancing several methods of improving judicial oversight of the plea
bargaining process).
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[I]f the prosecutor is interested in buying the reliability assur-
ance that accompanies a waiver agreement, then precluding
waiver can only stifle the market for plea bargains. A defendant
can maximize what he has to sell only if he is permitted to
offer what the prosecutor is most interested in buying.181
These conceptual guideposts of markets and contract supported
the turn to unregulated prosecutorial discretion and cut against
judicial oversight of party behavior or substantive agreements. The
Court rejected lower courts post-Santobello doctrines of plea bar-
gain fairness by reconceiving fairness in constitutional law to match
the notion of fairness that prevails in the private market realm. In
the private sphere, fairness means autonomy from state regulation
to compete against or negotiate with others and enter into contracts,
with few legal standards about fair bargaining practices, conditions,
and contract terms.
Conceptualizing plea bargaining as just another voluntary
interaction between private parties undercuts reasons to regulate
prosecutorial behavior. Any difficult choices that prosecutors
manufacture for defendants are taken as an inevitable attribute of
any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotia-
tion of pleas.182 Judges should be concerned with little more than
whether a defendant had competent legal assistance and had not
misunderstood the choices that were placed before him; constitu-
tional law has almost nothing to say about whether choices the state
creates for defendants are fair or coercive.183 Fairness requires no
specific attention because plea bargains, like private contracts, arise
181. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995).
182. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 n.9 (1978) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,
412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973)).
183. Id. at 225 (emphasis added); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)
(emphasizing the voluntariness of the guilty plea). However, in some states, agreements
between prosecutors and defendants are enforceable only after a court has approved the
agreement in a formal judgment. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(g) (agreement not binding
on either party until approved by court). Limited exceptions apply primarily if the defendant
performed his part of an agreement to his potential detriment, often by voluntarily submitting
to forensic testing. For representative decisions taking this view and citing other courts
adopting this approach, see State v. Vixamar, 687 So. 2d 300, 301-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997), and Commonwealth v. Scuilli, 621 A.2d 620, 622-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
1274 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1225
from a process mutually beneficial to both the defendant and the
State.184
With this transformation, Santobellos fairness requirement lost
any real force. Rather than viewing prosecutors as state officials on
whom public law imposes distinctive obligations, constitutional law
now largely treats prosecutors and defendants in the plea negotia-
tion context like any two private actors competing and negotiating
in a free market. By the time of its 1984 decision in Mabry v. John-
son, the Court had effectively done away with Blackledge-style
scrutiny of bad prosecutorial motives and rejected any fair bargain-
ing standard for prosecutors higher than that for other parties.185
Constitutional limits and judicial oversight for prosecutors would
only impair the efficiency of adjudication. Likewise, Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, which rejected judicial supervision of charging tactics to
ratchet up pressure to plead guilty,186 serves the ambition of making
plea bargains quicker and more likely.187 The same is true of United
States v. Batchelder, which held that federal prosecutors have
complete discretion in each case to choose between two identical
statutes that carry separate punishments.188 On this point, like
others, state courts have overwhelmingly adopted the same rule
under state law.189
184. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 222.
185. 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984).
186. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
187. 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ([B]y tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas,
this Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the
prosecutors interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to
plead not guilty.).
188. 442 U.S. 114, 123-25 (1979).
189. See Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 662 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (adopting Batchelder, and
noting that the majority of states have done the same); Commonwealth v. Parker White
Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358, 1368-69 (Pa. 1986) (upholding statute permitting prosecutors to
choose between summary and misdemeanor offense for same wrongdoing on Batchelder
grounds); State v. Rooney, 19 A.3d 92, 102 (Vt. 2011) (adopting Batchelder position as state
law and observing that most states have embraced the reasoning in Batchelder); Johnson
v. State, 61 P.3d 1234, 1248 (Wyo. 2003) (following Batchelder along with [m]any of our sister
jurisdictions). A small number of states depart from the Batchelder approach, mostly in pre-
Batchelder decisions. See People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69, 74 (Colo. 1981) (In sharp contrast to
Batchelder, we have held consistently that equal protection of the laws requires that statutory
classifications of crimes be based on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related
to the general purposes of criminal legislation.); Spillers v. State, 436 P.2d 18, 23 (Nev. 1968)
(A state may not prescribe different penalties for the same offense without violating the
equal protection concept.), overruled in part by Bean v. State, 465 P.2d 133 (Nev. 1970); State
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The Courts most recent decisions on plea bargaining fit this arc
as well, despite modestly increasing one aspect of constitutional
regulation. Missouri v. Frye,190 Lafler v. Cooper,191 and Padilla v.
Kentucky192 all strengthened the constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel in the context of plea negotiations. Those
decisions are committed to ensuring a defendants informed en-
gagement in the bargaining process. In particular, a defendant must
be told of a prosecutors plea bargain offer, receive competent advice
on his prospects at trial, and be informed of certain kinds of nonpu-
nitive collateral consequences, such as deportation, that follow from
conviction.193 Those decisions aim to ensure a defendants capacity
to negotiate aboutor at least choose amongthe options that
prosecutors define. But none restrict coercive Bordenkircher-like
plea bargaining tactics nor otherwise regulate plea agreement terms
or negotiating practices.
CONCLUSION
The history of American criminal justice includes multiple prac-
tices by which executive power over criminal prosecution was
constrained and supervised rather than left effectively unfettered.
Privatizing prosecutorial authorityallowing that power to be
shared with private actorswas one such check. Others arose from
the various powers judges exercised: occasionally in a few states by
appointing prosecutors or compelling them to explain charging deci-
sions, but more often by their authority to control the pursuit or
dismissal of charges that prosecutors initiated. Two broad sets of
ideas led American criminal practice away from a balanced legal
structure for criminal prosecution and in particular for plea
v. Chavez, 419 P.2d 456, 458 (N.M. 1966) (when two statutes condemn the same act but car-
ry different penalties, they are irreconcilable and prosecution must proceed under the more
recently enacted because the legislatures last expression would control. Otherwise, law
enforcement officials could subject one person to the possibility of a greater punishment than
another who has committed an identical act, which would violate equal protection guaran-
tees); State v. Pirkey, 281 P.2d 698, 702-03 (Or. 1955) (holding statute unconstitutional that
allowed same conduct to be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor); State v. Shondel,
453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969).
190. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
191. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
192. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
193. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389-90; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
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bargaining: the idea that all key aspects of prosecution are exclu-
sively the province of executive officials, and the belief that
interaction between prosecutors and defendants works, and should
work, much like the interaction of private parties in ordinary
market settings. Neither of these ideasperhaps more obviously the
secondare compelled by federal constitutional law. But the Su-
preme Court elected to build constitutional doctrines on these
premises, and a remarkable degree of state courts, as well as
legislatures, adopted the same view. The result has been that the
U.S. practice of plea bargaining is remarkably unregulated, even
compared to other common law jurisdictions such as England. Both
of these ideas, and the normative visions that support them, will
have to change before it is possible to regulate plea bargaining
sufficiently to bring its practice within a plausible conception of the
rule of law.
